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(Un)Civil Denaturalization 
 
Cassandra Burke Robertson† and Irina D. Manta‡ 
 
Over the last fifty years, naturalized citizens in the United States were able to feel 
a sense of finality and security in their rights. Denaturalization, wielded frequently as a 
political tool in the McCarthy era, had become exceedingly rare. Indeed, denaturalization 
was best known as an adjunct to criminal proceedings brought against former Nazis and 
other war criminals who had entered the country under false pretenses.  
Denaturalization is no longer so rare. Naturalized citizens’ sense of security has 
been fundamentally shaken by policy developments in the last five years. The number of 
denaturalization cases is growing, and if current trends continue, they will continue to 
increase dramatically. This growth began under the Obama administration, which used 
improved digital tools to identify potential cases of naturalization fraud from years and 
decades ago. The Trump administration, however, is taking denaturalization to new levels 
as part of its overall immigration crackdown. It has announced plans for a denaturalization 
task force. And it is pursuing denaturalization as a civil-litigation remedy and not just a 
criminal sanction—a choice that prosecutors find advantageous because civil proceedings 
come with a lower burden of proof, no guarantee of counsel to the defendant, and no statute 
of limitations. In fact, the first successful denaturalization under this program was decided 
on summary judgment. It alleged that an asylum claim was improperly filed more than 
twenty-five years ago. The denaturalization judgment was granted in 2018, with the 
defendant never having been personally served with process and never making an 
appearance in the case, either on his own or through counsel. Even today, it is not clear 
that he knows he has lost his citizenship. 
 The legal status of denaturalization is murky, in part because the Supreme Court 
has long struggled to articulate a consistent view of citizenship and its prerogatives. 
Nonetheless, the Court has set a number of significant limits on the government’s attempts 
to remove citizenship at will—limits that are inconsistent with the administration’s 
current litigation policy. This Article argues that stripping Americans of citizenship 
through the route of civil litigation not only violates substantive and procedural due 
process, but also violates the rights guaranteed by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Last, but not least, (un)civil denaturalization undermines the constitutional 
safeguards of democracy.  
 
                                                      
† Cassandra Burke Robertson is the John Deaver Drinko—BakerHostetler Professor of Law and 
Director of the Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; University of Texas LBJ School of Public Affairs, 
M.P.Aff.; University of Texas M.A. (Middle Eastern Studies); University of Washington, B.A. 
‡ Irina D. Manta is the Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Professor of Law, 
and Founding Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law at the Maurice A. Deane 
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(Un)Civil Denaturalization 
 
Denaturalization is making a comeback in the United States. For half a 
century, denaturalization largely disappeared from American policy.1 Civil 
actions seeking to strip individuals’ citizenship have been exceedingly rare in the 
last fifty years. When they occurred, they were often the product of human rights 
groups’ efforts to identify former Nazis and war criminals who had used forged 
and fraudulent credentials to avoid accountability.2 
Now, however, the government has ramped up the number of 
denaturalization cases it is filing. News reports detail how government officials 
are searching through old records, digitizing fingerprint records from decades ago 
and looking for irregularities that might lead to new denaturalization actions.3  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has requested funding to 
institute a task force aimed at bringing more civil and criminal actions against 
individuals who were allegedly unqualified to obtain citizenship. The program 
has so far identified 887 potential leads, and expects to review another 700,000 
naturalized citizens’ files, to see if there are grounds for potential 
denaturalization.4 
These additional denaturalization proceedings might not seem like a lot 
given the sheer number of naturalized citizens in the country. Every year, 
approximately 700,000 individuals become naturalized citizens of the United 
States. There are nearly 20 million naturalized citizens currently residing in the 
United States, representing more than 6.5% of the nation’s citizens.5 Naturalized 
                                                      
1 See infra Part II. 
2 Id. 
3 Nick Miroff, Scanning Immigrants’ Old Fingerprints, U.S. Threatens to Strip Thousands Of 
Citizenship, WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/scanning-immigrants-old-fingerprints-us-threatens-to-strip-thousands-of-
citizenship/2018/06/13/2230d8a2-6f2e-11e8-afd5-
778aca903bbe_story.html?utm_term=.50d44e4aaa2e. 
4 Matthew Hoppock, Operation Janus and Operation Second Look: Denaturalization of Citizens With 
Removal Orders (March 4, 2018), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/operation-janus-operation-
second-look-denaturalization-citizens-removal-orders/ [hereinafter “Hoppock, Second Look”]. 
5 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Naturalization Rate Among U.S. Immigrants Up 
Since 2005, With India Among The Biggest Gainers, Pew Research Center (Jan. 18, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/18/naturalization-rate-among-u-s-immigrants-
up-since-2005-with-india-among-the-biggest-gainers/ (providing the number of naturalized 
citizens); Population Distribution by Citizenship Status, Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-citizenship-
status/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
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citizens enjoy the full benefits and responsibility of U.S. citizenship, including the 
right to vote in state and federal elections, the right to travel with a U.S. passport, 
the right and duty to serve on a jury, and legal protection against deportation 
proceedings.6 In fact, the Supreme Court has said, the only difference between the 
rights of naturalized citizens and those born in the United States is eligibility to 
serve as President.7 
But even if the program results in only a few hundred additional 
proceedings, it still creates a culture of fear that permeates through the community 
of immigrants and naturalized citizens. As one reporter stated, “[f]ear also threads 
through people fast, and spreads quickly, especially online. After the immigration 
agency’s announcement, many naturalized citizens were left questioning the 
validity of an immigration status they assumed would always be safe.”8 People 
may begin second-guessing their decision to seek naturalization; “afraid of being 
targeted or tripped up in a lie, [they] may now never pursue naturalization at all, 
even if they are eligible.”9 
This fear is compounded by denaturalization procedures. First, although 
U.S. attorneys often have discretion over whether to file cases in the civil or 
criminal justice systems, the Trump administration is increasingly relying on 
ordinary civil litigation to seek denaturalization. In fact, in a 2017 article in the U.S. 
Attorneys Bulletin, several government officials “encourage[d] Federal 
prosecutors to consider referring cases for civil denaturalization when a case is 
declined for prosecution.”10 They wrote that filing civil proceedings rather than 
criminal actions offers several “benefits”: civil litigation carries a lower burden of 
proof; there is no statute of limitations on civil denaturalization; there is no right 
to a jury trial; and there is no right to appointed counsel.11  
                                                      
asc%22%7D (noting that the number of United States citizens is approximately 297 million as 
of 2017). 
6 Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, supra note 5. 
7 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (“Citizenship obtained through naturalization 
is not a second-class citizenship. It has been said that citizenship carries with it all of the rights 
and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth in this country ‘save that of eligibility to the 
Presidency.’”). 
8 Stephanie deGooyer, Why Trump’s Denaturalization Task Force Matters, NATION, July 10, 2018, 
at https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-denaturalization-task-force-matters/. 
9 Id. 
10 Anthony D. Blanco et al., Civil Denaturalization: Safeguarding the Integrity of U.S. Citizenship, 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 6 (July 2017) at 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/984701/download. 
11 Id. at 8.  
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While these factors may make denaturalization cases easier for the 
government to win, they also create substantial due process risks to the defendant. 
Two recent cases highlight the inequities arising when civil litigation puts 
citizenship at risk. In the first case, the defendant may be unaware even now that 
he has lost his citizenship. Because he was not personally served, we do not know 
whether he had actual notice of the denaturalization proceeding against him.12 At 
any rate, he did not show up to the hearing, and no attorney entered an appearance 
on his behalf. As a result, the government was able to obtain a summary judgment 
granting denaturalization.13 In the second case, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
helping her boss commit financial fraud.14 Although it is undisputed that the 
defendant played only a very minor role in her boss’ underlying fraud, did not 
personally benefit from it, and helped the FBI build a case against her employer, 
the government nevertheless contends that her plea demonstrates that she lacks 
the good moral character necessary to qualify for citizenship. 
This Article explores denaturalization’s uneasy fit into civil litigation. It 
examines the history of denaturalization policy and how the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence pushed back against statutory encroachments on 
citizenship rights. It argues that even though the Supreme Court has more recently 
applied a more limited and textualist approach to denaturalization cases, civil 
denaturalization contradicts the due-process guarantee that the Court has 
developed in other contexts. The Article concludes that civil denaturalization 
violates both the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that it is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
democratic framework established by the United States Constitution.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains current denaturalization 
law and policy, and it explores how that law and policy plays out in recent 
denaturalization actions. Part II looks at the historical basis of denaturalization 
actions. It examines how the government’s denaturalization policy expanded 
during the early part of the twentieth century, as well as how it declined in the 
years after the Red Scare. Part III turns to the constitutional law of 
denaturalization. It analyzes the changing limits that the Supreme Court has put 
on denaturalization actions over time, and concludes that the Court has struggled 
to articulate a consistent view of citizenship rights. Finally, Part IV examines how 
current denaturalization law and policy fit within the constitutional structure set 
out in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It argues that civil denaturalization 
actions do not comport with constitutional protections: first, civil denaturalization 
                                                      
12 See infra Part I.B.i. 
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See infra Part I.B.ii. 
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actions violate procedural due process requirements; second, civil 
denaturalization actions contravene both the Citizenship Clause and the 
substantive due process protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment; and 
finally, such actions undermine constitutional protections of citizen sovereignty.  
I. The Renewed Threat of Denaturalization 
Although denaturalization was a relatively common action during the first 
half of the twentieth century, it has been used exceedingly rarely since 1967. That 
year, the Supreme Court effectively limited the potential grounds for 
denaturalization to fraud and illegal procurement.15 In the years after that, 
denaturalization was rarely used even when it was statutorily authorized. Instead, 
the Department of Justice used its prosecutorial authority primarily to seek the 
denaturalization of former Nazi officials and other war criminals, and did not 
typically go after more ordinary cases. Now, however, the number of 
denaturalization cases is growing and gaining significant public attention.16 
 There are two primary mechanisms for seeking denaturalization under 
current law.17 The first is through a criminal naturalization-fraud proceeding.18 
When an individual is convicted of “procurement of citizenship or naturalization 
unlawfully,” under 18 U.S.C. § 1425, the court is required to revoke the defendant’s 
naturalization.19 The second mechanism, and the focus of this Article, is through a 
civil proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). This section allows a U.S. attorney to file 
suit seeking to revoke citizenship on two potential grounds: first, that the 
                                                      
15 See infra Part III.B. and III.C. 
16 Patricia Mazzei, Congratulations, You Are Now a U.S. Citizen. Unless Someone Decides Later 
You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018) (“Since President Trump took office, the number of 
denaturalization cases has been growing, part of a campaign of aggressive immigration 
enforcement that now promises to include even the most protected class of legal immigrants: 
naturalized citizens.”). 
17 See Hanna E. Borsilli, Comment, But It’s Just a Little White Lie! An Analysis of the Materiality 
Requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, 122 DICKINSON L. REV. 675, 681-88 (2018) (providing a detailed 
explanation of the grounds for denaturalization). 
18 Blanco et al., supra note 11, at 6. 
19 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) (“When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of title 18 of 
knowingly procuring naturalization in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is 
had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order admitting such person 
to citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled.”). 
Conviction also carries a potential ten- to twenty-five-year term of incarceration. 18 U.S.C. § 
1425. 
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naturalization was “illegally procured,” (that is, the individual did not meet the 
statutory requirements for citizenship, including the requirement for “good moral 
character”) or second, that the naturalization was “procured by concealment of a 
material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” Because denaturalization 
proceedings are considered equitable in nature, they traditionally carry no right to 
a jury.20  
When the court grants denaturalization, the individual who loses 
citizenship reverts back to the immigration status held immediately prior to 
naturalization—often the status of lawful permanent resident.21 Further 
proceedings may change that status, however, potentially leading to a removal 
order requiring deportation.22 Denaturalization relates back to the original grant 
of citizenship; the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that denaturalization 
“shall be effective as of the original date” of naturalization.23  
This “relation back” policy can have serious consequences. When a civil 
denaturalization case finds that the defendant has gained citizenship “by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation,” then the spouse 
and child of the defendant may lose their citizenship as well. Under the statute, 
the individuals who gained citizenship “by virtue of such naturalization of such 
parent or spouse” are deemed to lose citizenship, even if they reside in the United 
States.24 Of course, a child who otherwise qualified for citizenship (for example, 
one born in the United States) would not have obtained citizenship though the 
parent’s naturalization, and would therefore not be at risk for loss of citizenship.25 
But a child born abroad would lose citizenship in such a case. One court has even 
held that such a child is not entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in 
the parent’s denaturalization case, as the child’s citizenship rights “must rise or 
                                                      
20 Blanco et al., supra note 11, at 6. 
21 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 96.13 (Matthew Bender, Rev. 
Ed. 2018) (“The immediate effect of denaturalization, of course, is to divest the naturalized 
persons of their status as U.S. citizens, to restore them to the former status of alienage, and to 
make them amenable to the consequences of such alien status.”). 
22 5 id. at § 64.03 (discussing removal procedure). 
23 INA § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
24 INA § 340(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(d). 
25 Even birthright citizenship, however, is currently under challenge. See Ediberto Román & 
Ernesto Sagás, Birthright Citizenship Under Attack: How Dominican Nationality Laws May Be the 
Future of U.S. Exclusion, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2017) (“Trump promised that, if elected, 
his administration would ‘end birthright citizenship.’”) (citing Donald Trump, Immigration 
Reform that Will Make America Great Again, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Immigration-
Reform-Trump.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2018)). 
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fall solely on the basis of the rights of the  . . . parent from whom they stem, and 
there are no rights to be protected independently by guardian ad litem.”26 
A. Recent Trends Shaping Current Denaturalization Policy 
The current growth of denaturalization as a policy tool results from the 
intersection of several recent trends. The first is the shrinking cost of computing 
power: it is now much easier to digitize records and to use software tools to 
analyze hundreds of thousands of records at once.27 And the impetus to do so took 
root in the Obama administration, which asserted a national security interest in 
examining potential cases of immigration fraud that could potentially be tied to 
terrorist threats. Overall, the Obama years saw a significant increase in 
immigration enforcement. 28 
 After President Trump took office in January 2017, the government 
adopted a so-called zero-tolerance immigration policy.29  Of course, there are 
simply too many immigrants and potential immigrants to enforce all of the 
immigration laws all of the time, so what the zero-tolerance policy meant in 
practice was that sanctions would be applied in an unpredictable and arbitrary 
manner—a potential violation of due process.30 Unlike in the past, there would be 
                                                      
26 U.S. ex rel. Harrington v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1943). 
27 Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2015) (explaining that 
“transaction costs for the collection and analysis of data have rapidly decreased. Therefore, 
economic restraints on investigatory and administrative capacity to impose consequences are 
rapidly decreasing as well”). 
28 Elliott Young, Felons and Families, UNC PRESS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2017) at 
https://uncpressblog.com/2017/04/03/elliott-young-felons-and-families/ (“Trump’s 
immigration policies, as drastic and horrible as they are, merely accelerate the criminalization 
of immigrants that was in full swing under Obama.”). 
29 See Lorelei Laird, Border Lines: ABA Works to Meet Immigrants’ Increased Need for Legal Assistance 
and Oppose Family Separations, ABA J., Aug. 2018, at 64 (explaining how the adoption of the zero-
tolerance policy has resulted in a greater need for legal services); Bill Ong Hing, Entering the 
Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 
315–16 (2018) (“Although the likelihood of an ICE encounter may still be small, immigration 
enforcement since the election of President Trump is up. ICE is following the new enforcement 
priorities and making collateral arrests along the way.”). 
30 See infra Part I.A.ii; Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (“(T)he 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action . . . (is) the very essence of due process.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or 
the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 292 (2012) (“An arbitrary act has either 
no reasons to explain it or only reasons that would with equal plausibility justify the opposite 
act.”). 
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no tolerance for small infractions. Activities that might have been tolerated under 
a doctrine of prosecutorial discretion could now be subject to immediate 
sanction—but no one could predict when and on whom those sanctions would 
fall. 
i. Newly Digitized Data and Operation Janus  
Janus was the two-faced Roman god of “beginnings and transitions,” 
looking simultaneously into the past and the future.31 The Department of 
Homeland Security’s “Operation Janus” similarly looks back over the files of 
naturalized citizens, examining the historical record to see whether evidence 
overlooked in the past could support filing a future denaturalization proceeding.32 
The effort focuses on individuals from “special interest countries,” related to 
national-security priorities, largely (though not entirely) centered on the Middle 
East.33  
The program began under the Obama administration in 2009, when the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection identified 206 individuals “who had received 
final deportation orders and subsequently used a different biographic identity, 
such as a name and date of birth, to obtain an immigration benefit (e.g., legal 
permanent resident status or citizenship).”34 Further inquiry revealed another 
1,029 cases of individuals with previously overlooked deportation orders who had 
nonetheless been granted citizenship, 858 of whom did not have digital 
fingerprints on file.35 As a result, the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
                                                      
31 John Patrick Clayton, Note, The Two Faces of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past and New Beginning 
of Rule 10b-5, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 853, 854 (2014). 
32 See Hoppock, Second Look, supra note 4 (analyzing government reports regarding Operation 
Janus and Operation Second Look). 
33 Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Potentially Ineligible Individuals 
Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records 1, n. 2 (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/ Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-130-Sep16.pdf (“Special 
interest countries are generally defined as countries that are of concern to the national security 
of the United States, based on several U.S. Government reports.”); see also Cato, Coming to 
America: The Weaponization of Immigration, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 309, 326 (2007) (describing “thirty-
five nations designated by the United States Department of Homeland Security as ‘special 
interest’ countries . . . so labeled because American intelligence identifies them as likely 
exporters of terrorism,” including “Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Pakistan, Cuba, Brazil, Ecuador, China, Russia, Yemen, Albania, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan,” 
as well as others). 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Id. These numbers represent a very small fraction of the foreign-born population in the United 
States because well over a million individuals per year legally immigrate to the United States. 
See Jie Zong et al. , FREQUENTLY REQUESTED STATISTICS ON IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION IN THE 
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Services began a concerted effort to digitize and upload decades-old fingerprint 
records and to match those records with immigration files.36  
In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General reported that ICE had identified 
315,000 files with missing fingerprint records but had “not yet reviewed about 
148,000 aliens’ files to try to retrieve and digitize the old fingerprint cards.”37 That 
process is now ongoing, and the agency has sought funds to expand it even more. 
ICE’s 2019 budget request seeks funds to review another 700,000 files—all with the 
purpose of seeking potential deportation or denaturalization.38   
As of August 2018, the Department of Justice had announced the filing of 
seven actions arising from Operation Janus.39 Three of those are criminal actions 
for fraud in the immigration process. Two of those cases ended with a plea 
agreement that includes denaturalization, and one ended in a criminal 
conviction.40 An additional four cases were filed as civil actions seeking 
denaturalization. Of the civil actions filed, only the first has been concluded; it 
resulted in a summary judgment of denaturalization.41 Immigration law experts 
expect a number of additional cases to be filed in the near future.42 
ii. Zero Tolerance 
In one of his major campaign speeches in September 2016, then-candidate 
Donald Trump announced that if he is elected “all immigration laws will be 
enforced . . . [and] no one will be immune or exempt from enforcement . . . . Anyone 
who has entered the United States illegally is subject to deportation – that is what 
it means to have laws and to have a country.” Because of the significant number 
                                                      
UNITED STATES, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-
immigration-united-states. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 2-4. 
38 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT BUDGET 
OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20Enforcement.pdf; see also Hoppock, 
Second Look, supra note 4. 
39 See Hoppock, Second Look, supra note 4. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see infra Part I.B. 
42 Matthew Hoppock, Three Operation Janus Updates in the Pending Cases in Federal Court (May 15, 
2018), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/three-operation-janus-updates-in-the-pending-
cases-in-federal-court/  (“We anticipate the DOJ will be filing more of these cases shortly, 
especially if they can get these cases granted without having to fight very hard.”). 
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of individuals who have entered the United States illegally or have a more minor 
problem in their record, it is essentially impossible to pursue everyone. The result 
is arbitrary and unpredictable enforcement. In some cases, individuals on the path 
to regularization are trapped at the exact moment that they believed their legal 
situation was about to be resolved: 
 
As the Trump administration arrests thousands of immigrants with no 
criminal history and reshapes the prospects of even legal immigrants — 
an overdue corrective, officials say, to the lenient policies of the past — 
many who have lived without papers for years are urgently seeking legal 
status by way of a parent, adult child or spouse who is already a citizen or 
permanent resident. In a growing number of cases, however, immigrants 
with old deportation orders that were never enforced are getting the go-
ahead after an interview by United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, the agency that handles residency and citizenship, only to be 
arrested by ICE.43 
 
Internal emails uncovered by the ACLU have revealed coordination between 
USCIS and ICE to nab undocumented immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens when the 
spouses were coming to interview to obtain legal status.44 This included the 
spreading out of interviews to increase enforcement and the delaying of an 
interview to give ICE the chance to show up and arrest the individual.45  
Stories are also trickling out of individuals being deported after serving in 
the U.S. military when this had become a shield against such actions.46 Military 
spouses are suffering similar fates, and families are ripped apart even when there 
was no criminal behavior or anything else that raised obvious problems.47 
                                                      
43 Vivian Yee, A Marriage Used to Prevent Deportation. Not Anymore., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/immigration-marriage-green-card.html. 
44 Sonia Moghe & David Shortell, ACLU: Officials Set up ‘Trap’ to Arrest Immigrants at Legal Status 
Interviews, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/ice-immigrants-
trap-lawsuit-aclu/index.html.  
45 See id. 
46 See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, The Story Behind this Powerful Photo of Deported Military Veterans 
Saluting the U.S. Flag, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/11/16/the-story-behind-this-
powerful-photo-of-deported-military-veterans-saluting-the-american-
flag/?utm_term=.463ad5f83584.  
47 See, e.g., Associated Press, ‘It’s an Absolute Disgrace’: Tears and Anger as Wife of US Marine 
Deported to Mexico, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2018)  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/us-marine-wife-alejandra-juarez-deported-
mexico.  
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One of the most disconcerting trends involves deporting or threatening 
with deportation individuals who acted legally and/or in reliance on previous 
actions by the government. The executive is currently locked in a battle with the 
courts over the fate of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program, which seeks to protect from deportation young individuals who came to 
the United States as children, and a federal district court judge ruled most recently 
that the administration is obligated to restore the program.48 At the time of this 
writing, the administration is considering implementing policy changes proposed 
by White House advisor Stephen Miller that raise grave concerns in that respect 
as well. Miller has proposed changing the definition of “public charge” to make 
legal immigrants’ past use of a whole host of government benefits a barrier to 
permanent residency or even citizenship.49 Aside from the question of the general 
wisdom of this policy, the due process aspects of its retroactivity are disconcerting. 
People who followed the law, in some cases pressured to obtain (subsidized) 
insurance by the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act lest they have to 
pay a hefty penalty, could now find themselves at risk of not being able to improve 
or even maintain their status; indeed, some suggest that green card holders could 
even lose their existing status under this plan.50 What began as rhetoric about 
fighting illegal immigration and crime has rapidly morphed into attacks on legal 
behaviors made suspect—after the fact—only because they belonged to foreign-
born nationals.  
B. The Two Trends Converge in Current Litigation 
Both of these trends—looking back at old cases with the help of newly 
digitized data and increasing enforcement without regard to mitigating factors— 
have led to a perfect storm in denaturalization cases, creating a reasonable fear 
that even long-ago mistakes can unravel current citizenship rights. Operation 
                                                      
48 NAACP v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-1907 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2017cv1907-27. See also Vanessa Romo, 
Judge Orders Trump Administration to Fully Restore DACA, NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635546997/judge-orders-trump-administration-to-fully-
restore-daca (Aug. 3, 2018).  
49 Tal Kopan, Sources: Stephen Miller Pushing Policy to Make It Harder for Immigrants Who Received 
Benefits to Earn Citizenship, CNN (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/politics/stephen-miller-immigrants-penalize-
benefits/index.html. 
50 See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, Plan to Punish Immigrants for Using Welfare Could Boost 
G.O.P. Candidates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/us/politics/legal-immigrants-welfare-republicans-
trump.html. 
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Janus has led to the filing of several civil denaturalization cases, including the first 
case to reach judgment: that of Baljinder Singh, who sought asylum in the United 
States as a teenager in the early 1990s, and obtained citizenship in 2007. Singh has 
no reported criminal history. Similarly, the zero-tolerance approach resulted in the 
government seeking to denaturalize Norma Borgoño, a 63-year-old grandmother 
who was, in the government’s words, a “minimal participant” in her former boss’s 
fraud but who helped the FBI build the case against him. Without the zero-
tolerance policy, the government likely would have exercised prosecutorial 
discretion not to seek her denaturalization. Under the current policy in place 
however, the government filed civil denaturalization actions against both Singh 
and Borgoño. 
i. Baljinder Singh: Newly Digitized Data 
Baljinder Singh had immigrated to the United States as a fifteen- or sixteen-
year-old in 1991.51 In February of 1992, he filed an application for political asylum. 
Nearly five years later, while his asylum application was still pending, Singh 
married a U.S. citizen and applied for an adjustment of status. In 1998, he was 
granted lawful permanent resident status. In 2006, Singh took the Oath of 
Allegiance to the United States and became a naturalized citizen.  
Twelve years later, Singh’s file was reviewed as part of Operation Janus. 
The government alleged that Singh had originally entered the United States under 
the name Davinder Singh and had filed an earlier proceeding under that name. He 
had allegedly arrived in the U.S. on a flight from Hong Kong in September 1991, 
as a teenager traveling without a passport or any other identification papers.52 A 
Punjabi interpreter wrote his name down as “Davinder Singh.”53 He was 
fingerprinted and detained for nearly two weeks, then released on bond to stay 
with a friend in October of that year.54 Three weeks after his release, notice of an 
upcoming immigration hearing was mailed to his friend’s house. When he failed 
to show up for the hearing in January of 1992, the court ordered him deported in 
absentia.55   
At nearly the same time, however, a parallel case was going forward in 
another courtroom: An asylum action for “Baljinder Singh” was filed on February 
                                                      
51 Complaint, U.S. v. Singh, United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Case 2:17-cv-07214, 
Sept. 19, 2017. 
52 United States v. Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018) 
53 Id. 
54 Complaint, U.S. v. Singh, United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Case 2:17-cv-07214, 
Sept. 19, 2017 at 4. 
55 United States v. Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018) 
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6, 1992, less than a month after “Davinder” had failed to show up for the asylum 
hearing in the other case.56 That case was never dismissed on the merits; instead, 
it remained pending for more than four years until Baljinder Singh married a U.S. 
citizen and obtained adjustment of his immigration status to lawful permanent 
resident, and later obtained naturalization.57 
It was not until Operation Janus was able to digitize the old fingerprint 
cards and use electronic resources to analyze them that the two cases were ever 
connected. The Justice Department compared “a January 24, 1992 fingerprint card 
bearing the name Baljinder Singh to a September 25, 1991 fingerprint card bearing 
the name Davinder Singh.”58 The investigation concluded that “[b]ased on a 
comparative analysis of the friction ridge details of each fingerprint . . . the 
fingerprints match and belong to the same individual.” 
In September 2017, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey 
filed a civil denaturalization complaint against Singh. In its complaint, the 
government alleged that Singh had procured naturalization by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation.59 
Singh did not file an answer or appear in the lawsuit, and there is no record 
of an attorney representing him in the case. As a result, when the government 
moved for summary judgment, it was unopposed. The district court consequently 
held that “by failing to respond to the complaint, Defendant has defaulted and 
thus is ‘deemed to have admitted the factual allegations of the Complaint by virtue 
of [his] default.’”60 Taking the government’s allegations as true, and noting that 
there had been no evidence “to impeach the credibility of this scientific fingerprint 
analysis,” the court concluded that Singh had “procured his naturalization as a 
result of these misrepresentations and concealments.”61 The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the government, ruling that Singh would be 
denaturalized. 
Of course, we do not know why Singh did not answer the lawsuit. The 
agent who served process did not serve him personally—instead, the summons 
and complaint were left with someone else—a person of “suitable age and 
                                                      
56 Complaint, U.S. v. Singh, United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Case 2:17-cv-07214, 
Sept. 19, 2017 at 2-3 
57 Id. at 3. 
58 Id. 
59 Complaint, U.S. v. Singh, United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Case 2:17-cv-07214, 
Sept. 19, 2017 at 4. 
60 United States v. Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018) at *1, 
n.2 (quoting Doe v. Simone, 2013 WL 3772532, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013). 
61 Id. at *6. 
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discretion” who lived at his last known address.62  As a result, it is possible that he 
did not learn of the lawsuit in time to defend it. And it is possible that even now 
he does not know that he has lost his citizenship and therefore might have to wait 
until he tries to travel on a passport or vote in a federal election to find out that he 
is no longer a citizen of the United States. 
We also do not know why (assuming the government properly matched 
the fingerprint cards) Singh failed to show up to the earlier asylum hearing or why 
the case might have been filed under a different name. The government, of course, 
claims that this was intentional fraud—a person using two different names to gain 
an unfair advantage. But this is not a case where someone lost an asylum case on 
the merits before re-filing under a new name. There appears to be little or no 
benefit to Singh from filing two different asylum proceedings under two different 
names.  
It is possible that the Punjabi translator simply made a mistake in originally 
recording his name as “Davinder” rather than “Baljinder.” Competent Punjabi 
translators can be difficult to find; a lawyer for Gurbinder Singh, a later asylum 
seeker, reported that “the only translator he had been able to find in the general 
area was an Albuquerque-based cab driver who ha[d] only conversational Punjabi 
skills and couldn’t communicate at the level . . . needed to fill out his clients’ 
asylum claims in detail.”63 Perhaps a poorly prepared translator misunderstood 
Singh’s first name, and when Singh or his newly appointed lawyer contacted the 
court later, they were told that there was no filing under his name. If so, that could 
provide an innocuous explanation for why he then sought to file a second asylum 
proceeding less than a month after failing to show up for the first. 
But without the defendant present (either in person or through an 
attorney), we are left to guess. Apparently nothing in the second proceeding led 
the government to be concerned about Singh’s background or moral character, and 
nothing in the recent denaturalization petition suggests any later history of 
                                                      
62 See Process Receipt and Return (showing that service was made upon one Pritam Singh); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 4 (allowing service of process on a “person of suitable age and discretion” who shares 
a residence with the defendant). The shared last name of “Singh” does not necessarily suggest 
a familial relation. All Sikh males take the last name of Singh. See Singh and Kaur, Immigration 
Challenges of the Last Name, at http://www.garamchai.com/articleSingh.htm (noting that Sikh 
men began taking the common last name of “Singh” to avoid caste signifiers, and explaining 
that this tradition has caused difficulties in immigration).  In addition, the city of Carteret, 
where Baljinder Singh was last known to live, has the largest Sikh community in the state of 
New Jersey. Kevin Coyne, Turbans Make Targets, Some Sikhs Find, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2008) 
(stating that “New Jersey is home to more than 25,000 Sikhs,” and Carteret is “home to the 
largest concentration of Sikhs in the state”). 
63 Sonia Smith, The Long Road to Asylum, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 25, 2014), at 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/the-long-road-to-asylum/. 
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criminal activity. But twenty years after he was granted lawful permanent resident 
status, and more than ten years after becoming a United States citizen, Baljinder 
Singh was stripped of that citizenship—without the aid of an attorney and without 
the effective chance to contest the allegations against him. 
ii. Norma Borgoño: Zero Tolerance and Collateral Consequences 
Norma Borgoño, a 63-year-old grandmother who suffers from a rare 
kidney disease, is one of the individuals targeted for denaturalization based on 
criminal activity.64 Borgoño legally immigrated to the United States in 1989 and 
obtained U.S. citizenship in 2007.65 Between 2003 and 2009, Borgoño worked as an 
office manager for Guillermo Oscar Mondino. During this time, Mondino was 
orchestrating a fraudulent plan to obtain loan guarantees from The Export-Import 
Bank of the United States, the government’s official export credit agency. When 
the FBI investigated the fraud, Borgoño provided assistance. Mondino pleaded 
guilty to fraud and money laundering, was sentenced to nearly four years in 
prison, and was ordered to pay more than $13 million in restitution.66  
 Borgoño, as office manager, prepared paperwork that her boss used in the 
fraudulent transactions. When the FBI investigated the case, she provided 
assistance that helped to incriminate Mondino.67 Because she allegedly knew that 
her boss’s actions were fraudulent at the time that she helped to prepare the 
paperwork for the deals, she was charged with conspiracy—though the Justice 
Department acknowledged that she was a “minimal participant.”68 Rather than 
stand trial, Borgoño accepted a plea deal that gave her five years of probation and 
                                                      
64 Justice Department Seeks to Revoke Citizenship of Convicted Felons Who Conspired to Defraud U.S. 
Export-Import Bank of More Than $24 Million, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (May 8, 2018), at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-seeks-revoke-citizenship-convicted-felons-
who-conspired-defraud-us-export 
65 Affidavit of David Jansen, United States v. Norma Borgoño, Nov. 2. 2011 at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060901/download. 
66 Statement of the Offense, United States v. Mondino, at 4 (“Between April 2003 and October 1, 
2011, the Ex-Im Bank paid more than $15.9 million to lending banks or their assignees based on 
claims on guaranteed loans that had gone into default. As of April 1, 2010, more than $12.5 
million of the amounts paid on claims for defaulted loans remained unrecovered.”), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060916/download. 
67 deGooyer, supra note 8 (“She immigrated legally, suffers from a rare kidney disease, and even 
cooperated with the FBI when they investigated the crime. Still, after living and working for 
decades in the United States, she is facing deportation.”). 
68 Plea Offer, United States v. Norma Borgono, Nov. 2. 2011 at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060901/download. 
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required her to pay $5,000 in restitution.69 Borgoño did not share in the millions of 
dollars fraudulently paid out.70 At most, less than $2000 was paid to Borgoño’s 
account.71 While on probation, she worked a second job and paid the ordered 
restitution in full.72 
 The government’s denaturalization petition seeks to revoke Borgoño’s 
citizenship on the grounds that Borgoño lacked the requisite good moral character 
to qualify for naturalization. It alleges that she lied in her citizenship application 
by falsely answering “no” on the naturalization application when it asked whether 
she had “knowingly committed any crime for which she had not been arrested.”73 
It further alleges that Borgoño’s conspiracy conviction was a “fraud related 
offense” that “statutorily precludes” her from establishing good moral character 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), which provides that an applicant convicted of a crime 
of moral turpitude cannot establish good moral character. 
 Borgoño’s case is still pending, and the government may well lose on the 
merits. Even though fraud claims are typically considered crimes of moral 
turpitude, Borgoño’s case is not a typical one and it is not clear that the facts in 
Borgoño’s case meet the moral-turpitude standard. Borgoño neither orchestrated 
the scheme nor personally benefitted from it. She provided office support to a boss 
engaged in financial crime, and her only personal benefit was being allowed to 
keep her job—a job that may well have provided life-saving health-insurance 
benefits that allowed her to seek treatment for her kidney disorder.74  
 Furthermore, there is a not-insignificant chance that Borgoño may have 
been factually innocent of the crime she pleaded guilty to.75 Because she pleaded 
                                                      
69 Id. 
70 Adiel Kaplan, Miami Grandma Targeted as U.S. Takes Aim at Naturalized Immigrants with Prior 
Offenses, MIAMI HERALD (July 9, 2018), at 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article214173489.html. 
71 Information, United States v. Norma Borgono, Nov. 2. 2011 at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060901/download. 
72 Kaplan, supra note 70.  
73 Compl., ¶81, U.S. v. Borgono, May 5, 2018, at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1060906/download. 
74 Kaplan, supra note 70 (noting that Borgoño’s close family members in Peru had died of the 
same kidney disease she is now being treated for). 
75 A new report notes that this is not an infrequent occurrence. Nat’l Assoc. Defense Lawyers, 
The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport/ (“There is ample evidence that 
federal criminal defendants are being coerced to plead guilty because the penalty for exercising 
their constitutional rights is simply too high a risk.”). 
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guilty, the government did not need to prove that Borgoño understood that the 
paperwork she prepared for her boss was being used in a fraudulent transaction 
or that she had the intent to assist in his fraud. Perhaps she did have the requisite 
mens rea. But her sentence of probation and minimal restitution was not onerous, 
and Borgoño may well have judged that it was not worth the expense and risk of 
going to trial.76 Even if factually innocent, she may have worried about the 
possibility of a wrongful conviction. And she may also have not been sure of either 
her legal guilt or innocence: for example, she may have struggled to remember 
exactly what she knew at the time that she completed her boss’s paperwork—did 
she know her boss was committing fraud, or did she merely suspect it? Certainly, 
once the FBI approached her, she assisted in the investigation. But she likely would 
not have been able to evaluate her own potential liability, and it is not uncommon 
that a defendant “later may well question her own judgment and the 
reasonableness of her belief.”77 
Of course, that calculation only makes sense if Borgoño did not understand 
the potential collateral consequences of her plea—that pleading guilty could cause 
her citizenship to be stripped and create a risk that she could be deported to a 
country where she no longer has any family or personal connections. Indeed, she 
says now that she had no idea that denaturalization could be a potential 
consequence. If so, she may be able to challenge the underlying conviction, and 
with it, the government’s denaturalization petition. The Supreme Court held in 
Padilla v. Kentucky that attorneys provide ineffective assistance of counsel if they 
fail to inform clients that their plea “carries a risk of deportation.”78 
Denaturalization is a much more severe risk than deportation; under the logic of 
Padilla, a defendant who pleads guilty without being told of the risk of losing 
citizenship should be able to challenge that conviction. 
                                                      
76 Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 960–61 (2012) (“Despite 
stubborn perceptions to the contrary, innocent defendants plead guilty. Eight percent of the 
wrongfully convicted defendants exonerated by DNA initially entered guilty pleas, and the 
strong incentives that push some innocent defendants to plead guilty remain, suggesting that 
this trend may continue.”); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
949, 951 (2008) (“Innocent defendants often have less information about the case against them 
than guilty defendants and therefore cannot accurately evaluate the strength of the case against 
them.”). 
77  Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 
971 (1989) (noting that such problems can arise especially “under ambiguous circumstances,” 
where liability depends on the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions). 
78 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
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II. The Rise and Fall of Denaturalization Policy 
How do the Singh and Borgoño cases fit within the United States’ 
denaturalization policy? In short, they seem to reflect a throwback policy that does 
not fit into present-day denaturalization policy at all—and that is one of the 
reasons that the cases have caused such a public outcry.79 Denaturalization was 
relatively common in the first half of the twentieth century, with over 22,000 
Americans losing their citizenship between 1907 and 1967.80 But it rapidly fell out 
of favor in the second half of the twentieth century.81 Between 1968 and 2013, fewer 
than 150 Americans were denaturalized.82 As a result, one scholar concluded in 
2013 that “denaturalization has largely become a thing of the past,” primarily 
reserved for people who “camouflaged crimes against humanity prior to their 
immigration.”83 
 The decline in denaturalization coincided with a series of Supreme Court 
cases protective of citizenship rights.84 Those cases made it more difficult for the 
government to strip individuals of their citizenship. But they alone were not the 
driving force in denaturalization’s wane in the mid-to-late twentieth century; 
instead, the decline of the Red Scare and an increasing emphasis on civil rights 
played an equal or greater role. 
A. The Origin of Denaturalization Authority 
Denaturalization is never mentioned in the Constitution. Naturalization, 
on the other hand, is a power explicitly constitutionally given to Congress.85 
Congress accordingly developed criteria for when and how immigrants to the U.S. 
                                                      
79 Mazzei, supra note 16 (“The renewed focus on denaturalization, and a recent uptick in the 
number of cases filed by the Justice Department, have deeply unsettled many immigrants who 
had long believed that a United States passport warded off a lifetime of anxiety over possible 
deportation.”). 
80 PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 179 (2013). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 180. 
84 See infra Part III. 
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (“The Congress shall have Power  . . . ; To establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization”). 
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could gain citizenship.86 Originally, this process was very simple and 
geographically diffused. For more than a century, Congress allowed “any court of 
record”—from a district court, territorial court, or state court—to grant 
naturalization.87 Administrative power over naturalization did not become 
centralized until 1990, when Congress changed the procedure to create an 
administrative process for naturalization, supervised by the Attorney General.88 
Even after the executive branch took over primary responsibility for 
naturalization, the judiciary remained involved; even now, courts still administer 
the oath of citizenship.89 
 Even as naturalization procedures became more systematic, 
denaturalization got scant attention in American law or policy development. After 
all, in the earliest years of the United States, there was a strong public policy 
toward open immigration and simple procedures to obtain citizenship; “[i]t was a 
big country; they needed folks to settle it.”90  
But even in these early years, naturalization procedures were sometimes 
overlooked for political expedience. There was essentially a power struggle 
between state and federal courts. Congress authorized state courts to naturalize 
new citizens.91 But while Congress adopted naturalization procedures and 
requirements (including, for example, a five-year waiting period),92 state courts 
                                                      
86 For a description of the history of congressional legislation in this area, see Aram A. Gavoor 
& Daniel Miktus, Snap: How the Moral Elasticity of the Denaturalization Statute Goes Too Far, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637, 652 (2015). 
87 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE - POPULATING A NATION: A HISTORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, http://archive.li/mRgfx (noting that courts used their own 
processes and procedures for naturalization from 1802 until Congress passed the 1906 Act); 
Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that courts continued to exercise 
the naturalization power under Congress’s procedures until 1990). 
88 Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 86, at 652. 
89 Id. 
90 POPULATING A NATION, supra note 87. 
91 Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 85 (1951) (“By giving State courts jurisdiction in 
naturalization cases, Congress empowered some thousand State court judges to adjudicate 
citizenship.”). 
92  Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 86, at 647 (explaining that prior to 1906, an applicant for 
naturalization had to demonstrate five years of residence in the United States as well as good 
moral character and attachment to the Constitution; after 1906, there was an additional 90-day 
waiting period after the individual had filed an application before naturalization could be 
granted). 
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did not always follow them.93 Naturalizations also sometimes occurred en masse 
before local elections, in an effort to create new voters.94 As a result, it was not until 
1906 that Congress even adopted a statutory mechanism for denaturalization.95 In 
the Naturalization Act of 1906, Congress authorized U.S. district attorneys to bring 
suit “upon affidavit showing good cause therefore, to institute proceedings . . . for 
the purpose of setting aside and canceling the certificate of citizenship on the 
ground of fraud, or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally 
procured.”96  
In addition to providing a statutory procedure for citizenship revocation, 
the Act also established new requirements for citizenship that reflected changing 
beliefs about what it meant to be American. The Act made anarchists and 
polygamists ineligible to become American citizens.97 For the first time, citizenship 
eligibility depended on evaluation of personal belief—not just on the length of 
residence or willingness to take an oath of citizenship.98  
B. Early Growth of Denaturalization 
The Naturalization Act of 1906 explicitly tied citizenship to political belief 
for the first time.99 But the connection between naturalization policy and national 
identity soon grew stronger, as the United States began to grapple with what it 
meant to be an American—and with how that American identity should align with 
immigration, naturalization, and denaturalization policy.100 
Part of that identity had to do with race and gender. Citizenship-stripping 
provisions, in particular, reflected both gender and racial inequities. Married 
                                                      
93 WEIL, supra note 80, at 3 (“The state judiciary, however, did not always respect citizenship 
requirements set by federal law.”). 
94 Id. at 15. 
95 Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 86, at 649. Because naturalization in this era happened through 
court proceedings, often in state court, some denaturalization actions took place through the 
ordinary process by which judgments could be re-opened or vacated.  See Bindczyck, 342 U.S. 
at 81–82  (explaining that prior to the 1906 act, there were “widely diverse naturalization 
procedures,” for  “haphazard denaturalization,” including a number of cases in which “the then 
circuit courts had vacated naturalization orders at the suit of the Attorney General”). 
96 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596. 
97 Id. 
98 Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 86, at 650. 
99 Id. 
100 WEIL, supra note 80, at 56 (“A naturalized person who was Asian, spoke out against the war, 
or was a socialist, a communist, or a fascist risked the loss of his American citizenship.”). 
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women had no independent right to citizenship.101 A federal statute adopted in 
1907 provided that a woman would automatically lose her U.S. citizenship upon 
marriage to a foreign man, and could regain citizenship only “at the termination 
of the marital relationship.”102 Likewise, the federal naturalization statute allowed 
only “free white persons” and persons of African descent to become naturalized—
Asians were ineligible for naturalization (though still constitutionally entitled to 
citizenship as “natural born citizens” if born in the United States).103   
When these requirements were brought into denaturalization proceedings, 
both women and racial minorities risked losing their citizenship. A number of 
individuals from India had gained citizenship in the United States, for example, 
only to find it summarily stripped under the “illegal procurement” prong when 
the United States Supreme Court held that they were not, in fact, white.104 The 
Court stated that even though such individuals were “of high-caste Hindu stock . 
. . classified by certain scientific authorities as of the Caucasian or Aryan race,” 
they would not be understood as “white,” to the “common man.”105 As a result of 
these holdings, not only did Indian-born men lose their citizenship—but 
American-born women married to them automatically lost theirs as well, even 
though it rendered them stateless.106 Mary Das, “a member of an old American 
                                                      
101 See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915) (“We concur with counsel that citizenship is 
of tangible worth, and we sympathize with plaintiff in her desire to retain it . . . . But  . . . [t]he 
marriage of an American woman with a foreigner has consequences . . . as long as the relation 
lasts, it is made tantamount to expatriation.”). This requirement was partially repealed by 
Congress in 1922 with the passage of the Cable Act, and fully repealed in 1931. Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 
357 (2007). 
102 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915) (“We concur with counsel that citizenship is of 
tangible worth, and we sympathize with plaintiff in her desire to retain it . . . . But  . . . [t]he 
marriage of an American woman with a foreigner has consequences . . . as long as the relation 
lasts, it is made tantamount to expatriation.”). This requirement was partially repealed by 
Congress in 1922 with the passage of the Cable Act, and fully repealed in 1931. Chacón, supra 
note 101, at 357. 
103 United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. This standard was subject to criticism from its inception. See Note, The Nationality Act of 
1940, 54 HARV. L. REV. 860, 865 (1941) (“This substitution of common for scientific knowledge, 
while in keeping with legislative intent, did not establish a very workable standard. The 
common man, like the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is not quite sure as to a Parsee's 
racial status.”). 
106 Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through 
Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 435 (2005).  
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family from the South, of Revolutionary ancestry, a woman of wealth and 
prominence,” who had married a naturalized citizen from India described 
suffering “the humiliation and the thought of not being wanted as an American 
citizen.”107 
C. World Wars and the Fear of Communism 
Political denaturalization grew stronger during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, as the United States first fought two world wars and 
subsequently looked inward to fight against a perceived threat of communist 
sympathy. In some cases, the government bureaucracy was able to tie pre-existing 
naturalization requirements to more explicit political goals. The discretion 
inherent in deciding to bring denaturalization proceedings, combined with the 
likelihood of administrative error somewhere in the naturalization process, made 
it relatively easy for the government to target specific individuals.108 
Thus, for example, Emma Goldman—a radical activist, anarchist, and 
naturalized citizen—was targeted by the United States government, which sought 
a way to denaturalize and deport her.109 Because she seemed to have a valid claim 
to citizenship, the government was worried that arresting her would “add to her 
prestige,” potentially “bringing her in considerable sums in the way of 
contributions.”110 The government therefore found another way: it investigated the 
citizenship of her husband, and found that he had been naturalized before the age 
of 18. Because the Naturalization Act required applicants to be legal adults, the 
government could cancel his naturalization even many years later. Goldman, as a 
woman, lost her claim to citizenship when her husband was denaturalized111 and 
was ultimately deported from the United States in 1919.112 
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 After World War I, the United States “entered a period of increased 
nativism and hostility to immigrants.”113 The National Origins Act limited 
immigration from countries deemed less desirable, greatly reducing the number 
of immigrants from Italy, Russia, and Eastern Europe and “effectively 
eliminat[ing]” immigration from Japan.114 During this period, the Naturalization 
Act was also interpreted to exclude large classes of potential citizens. Pacifists and 
conscientious objectors, for example, were deemed unable to meet the 
Naturalization Act’s requirement of “attachment to the principles of the 
Constitution.”115 
 The 1940s saw significant growth in political denaturalization. Attorney 
General Robert Jackson first sought to identify and denaturalize members of the 
German American National League, called the “Bund,” a group sympathetic to 
Nazi aims.116 The Justice Department submitted to Congress a proposed bill to 
allow the denaturalization “for conduct that established a foreign allegiance” 
arising post-naturalization, but the bill was ultimately rejected by Congress after 
intense lobbying from the American Civil Liberties Union and the Federation of 
Constitutional Liberties.117 
 The failure to pass the bill did not dampen the enthusiasm for 
denaturalization attempts, however. In 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle 
created a new program “studying cases of disloyalty among naturalized 
citizens.”118 In Biddle’s words, denaturalization could be “a most important 
weapon in dealing with organized subversive and disloyal activities.”119  
The government pursued denaturalization cases against Nazi 
sympathizers—even when those sympathies developed later, after the individual 
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had been naturalized in the U.S.120 Furthermore, the government made a decision 
to publicize the program, as it made political leaders look “tough” in wartime, and 
also was a way of “appearing fair by demonstrating an apparent equality of 
treatment of Japanese and German Americans.”121 Of course, as scholar Patrick 
Weil pointed out, this equality of treatment was an illusion at best—Japanese 
immigrants were still barred from naturalization at the time, and even native-born 
Americans of Japanese descent were held in internment camps.122  
In addition to the executive branch policy of ramping up denaturalization, 
Congress also expanded the denaturalization power during this time period. The 
1940 Nationality Act provided “the first comprehensive rules governing 
expatriation.”123 It expanded the behaviors by which citizenship could be lost, for 
both native-born and naturalized citizens, including such grounds as voting in 
foreign elections, accepting employment in certain foreign government positions, 
and, for children, residing for six months or more in a country that counted their 
parents as citizens—even if the parents had been naturalized in the U.S.124 In 1952, 
additional provisions were added aimed at countering a perceived Communist 
threat and allowing the denaturalization of individuals engaged in “subversive 
activities.”125 
D. The Quiet Period 
Ultimately, all of these provisions were intended to unify an American 
identity. The government’s goal was to exclude those who might be seen as 
                                                      
120 See Baumgartner (ultimately holding that the Naturalization Act prohibited denaturalization 
based on an individual’s conduct and beliefs pre-dating his or her naturalization). 
121 WEIL, supra note 80, at 101. 
122 Id. 
123 Note, supra note 105, at 867. 
124 Id. at 868-869 (noting that the provision for children “has been criticized as being but a 
fragmentary effort to eliminate dual nationality acquired at birth.”). 
125 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1537); see also Note, Protecting Deportable Aliens from Physical 
Persecution: Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 62 YALE L.J. 845, 852 
(1953) (expecting to see an increase in the number of individuals deported for “subversive 
activities” resulting from “the broader provisions for deportation on political grounds 
contained in the McCarran Act”). The Act did, however, finally eliminate laws barring the 
nationalization of Asians individuals. 
26 
 
disloyal or un-American, or “regarded as prospective ‘fifth columnists.”126 The 
constitutionality of these grounds for denaturalization, however, was hotly 
contested. The Supreme Court ultimately adopted greater citizenship protections 
in a highly divided series of cases.127 As discussed more fully in the next Part, that 
change reduced the number of denaturalization cases initiated by the 
government.128  
A changing political environment, however, had an even bigger impact. 
When the “Red Scare” of the mid-twentieth century receded from public 
discourse, government officials lost their appetite for pursuing vast numbers of 
denaturalization cases.129 A few cases still went forward, including high-profile 
cases involving alleged war criminals.130 And in the late 1990s, when naturalization 
procedures were brought within the executive branch’s oversight, the Clinton 
administration also sought to create administrative procedures for 
denaturalization.131 The Ninth Circuit struck down the procedures, however, 
concluding that although Congress had delegated authority to the Attorney 
General for naturalization, nothing in the statute delegated authority for 
denaturalization.132 The Clinton administration decided not to appeal that ruling, 
instead choosing to abandon the idea of administrative denaturalization.  
Since the early 2000s, no president has attempted to reinstate such a 
program, and Congress has not provided explicit authority for one; 
denaturalization continues to require judicial action.133 In practice, however 
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denaturalization became exceedingly rare. In the half-century between 1968 and 
2018, only four denaturalization cases reached the Supreme Court.134 After the 
events of 9/11, some politicians proposed increasing the use of denaturalization as 
a tool to exclude individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist activity.135 Leaders 
of both political parties spoke up against the proposal, however, arguing that such 
a policy would violate both the Constitution and valued political norms. By 2013, 
a scholar specializing in the history of expatriation concluded that 
denaturalization was largely a policy of the past.136  
III. The Supreme Court’s Limits on Denaturalization  
What happened in the courts while the political branches were increasing 
their reliance on expatriation and denaturalization as a tool of political control? 
During the middle part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court overturned a 
number of denaturalization decisions. Its decisions protected citizenship rights 
through varying approaches, including procedural due process, substantive due 
process, and statutory formalism. But it can be hard to draw clear principles from 
these decisions that would govern in later cases, because the Court was often 
highly fractured. Some of the most important denaturalization decisions were 
decided only by a plurality of the Court, with numerous separate writings. But 
even if the underlying theory of citizenship was fractured, unclear, and subject to 
change over time, the judgments issued by the Supreme Court nevertheless place 
real limits on the political branches’ ability to wield denaturalization and 
expatriation as political weapons.  
A. Procedural Protection 
The earliest—and perhaps most important—limits adopted by the Supreme 
Court focused on procedural due process. First, the Court adopted a heightened 
standard of proof for denaturalization cases. In later decisions, the Court reversed 
a denaturalization that had been decided by default and required a heightened 
standard of appellate review. In spite of adopting positions favorable to the 
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individuals threatened with loss of citizenship, however, the Court was unable to 
pull together a majority in support of a unified rationale for those decisions. It 
therefore remains unclear whether these procedural protections are grounded in 
constitutional due process, or whether they are common-law rules subject to 
legislative change. 
i. Schneiderman: A Heightened Standard of Proof 
In Schneiderman v. United States,137 the Supreme Court was faced with a case of 
alleged naturalization fraud and illegal procurement. William Schneiderman had 
been a member of the Young Workers League of American and the Workers Party 
of America before his naturalization.138 As part of the naturalization process, he 
was required to show that he was “attached to the principles of the Constitution 
of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the 
same.”139 These two organizations were affiliated with the Communist Party, 
however, which the district court found to be an organization that is “opposed to 
the principles of the Constitution and advised, taught and advocated the 
overthrow of the government by force and violence.”140 As a result of his 
membership in the affiliated groups, the court concluded—twelve years after 
Schneiderman became a citizen of the United States—that he had lacked the 
requisite good moral character at the time of his naturalization and that his 
naturalization was therefore obtained illegally.141 
 The Supreme Court reversed. In the majority opinion authored by Justice 
Murphy, the Court noted that the government “proceeds here not upon the charge 
of fraud but upon the charge of illegal procurement.”142 Schneiderman had not lied 
about his affiliations; it was only after the fact that those affiliations were charged 
to be inconsistent with “good moral character” and attachment to constitutional 
principles.143 The government’s position, however, was that he failed to meet the 
good character requirement at the time of his naturalization and was therefore 
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subject to revocation of his citizenship. To Justice Douglas, who authored a 
concurrence, this retrospective review of personal beliefs should be enough to 
reverse the judgment; according to his opinion, that process was inconsistent with 
constitutional principles, especially free-speech and freedom-of-conscience 
protections:  
 
No citizen with such a threat hanging over his head could be 
free. If he belonged to ‘off-color’ organizations or held too 
radical or, perhaps, too reactionary views, for some segment of 
the judicial palate, when his admission took place, he could not 
open his mouth without fear his words would be held against 
him. For whatever he might say or whatever any such 
organization might advocate could be hauled forth at any time 
to show ‘continuity’ of belief from the day of his admission, or 
‘concealment’ at that time. Such a citizen would not be admitted 
to liberty. His best course would be silence or hypocrisy. This is 
not citizenship.144 
 
The Court, however, reversed the judgment on somewhat narrower 
grounds aimed at procedural due process. It held that the government had not 
sufficiently proved illegal procurement, because the evidence did not show that 
Schneiderman personally lacked attachment to the Constitution or believed in 
governmental overthrow.145 The Court stated that denaturalization was “more 
serious than a taking of one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or other 
penalty,” and citizenship could not be taken away “without the clearest sort of 
justification and proof.”146 
The Court specified two requirements that the evidence must meet. First, 
the total quantum of evidence must be sufficient to support the finding—and in 
this regard, the ordinary civil burden of “preponderance of the evidence” would 
not be sufficient.147 Instead, the facts must be proven by “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” evidence.148 Second, when the evidence lends itself to conflicting 
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inferences, those inferences must be drawn to favor the defendant in danger of 
losing his citizenship:  
 
We hold . . . that where two interpretations of an 
organization’s program are possible, the one reprehensible 
and a bar to naturalization and the other permissible, a court 
in a denaturalization proceeding, assuming that it can re-
examine a finding of attachment upon a charge of illegal 
procurement, is not justified in canceling a certificate of 
citizenship by imputing the reprehensible interpretation to a 
member of the organization in the absence of overt acts 
indicating that such was his interpretation.149 
 
Thus, the mere fact that Schneiderman belonged to two groups affiliated with the 
Communist Party was insufficient to prove his lack of attachment to the 
Constitution. There was some evidence that the Party supported violent 
overthrow of the government, but there was countervailing evidence that it sought 
change by peaceful means consistent with constitutional procedures.150 Without 
evidence that Schneiderman himself possessed the disqualifying belief, the district 
court was bound to infer from the contraditory evidence that Schneiderman did 
not support violent overthrow.151 
ii. Baumgartner and Knauer: A More Searching Review on Appeal  
Two cases over the next few years would reaffirm the heightened standard of 
proof and expand the procedural protections to include a more searching review 
on appeal.152 But even though the cases reaffirmed and expanded the procedural 
protections given to defendants in denaturalization cases, they made it clear that 
the justices were not in agreement about the basis of those procedural protections. 
Just one year after Schneiderman was decided, internal court papers from another 
denaturalization case—Baumgartner v. United States—showed that Justice 
Frankfurter believed that the standard was simply the ordinary heightened 
standard for proving fraud in a case at equity.153 Certainly, the Schneiderman case 
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had left the basis for the ruling less than clear—and had indeed cited to a fraud 
case applying the ordinary heightened standard.154 Justice Murphy, however, 
believed that the Court had gone further in Schneiderman. He took the opportunity 
in a later concurrence to reiterate his view, pointing out that “[w]e expressly did 
not pass upon the charge of fraud” in Schneiderman, and that “the requirement that 
the Government prove its case by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence . 
. . was a formulation by a majority of the Court of a rule of law governing all 
denaturalization proceedings.”155  
Although the justices disagreed about the basis for the heightened burden 
of proof, they nonetheless agreed that it applied in denaturalization cases.156 The 
Court further agreed that the heightened standard of proof also required 
heightened scrutiny on appeal to determine “whether that exacting standard of 
proof had been satisfied on the whole record.”157 For the defendant in Baumgartner, 
that heightened standard made a difference. Baumgartner had been accused of 
harboring Nazi sympathies at the time of his naturalization, and there was 
evidence that he had spoken in favor of Nazi policies. But under the heightened 
standard of proof required, the Court held that the record showed “insufficient 
proof” that he supported fascism when he took the oath of citizenship.158 As a 
result, the Supreme Court reversed the underlying judgment and Baumgartner 
was allowed to keep his citizenship.159 
Two years later, in Knauer v. United States, the Court returned to the 
Schneiderman standard.160 Ultimately, it found that the evidentiary requirement 
had been “plainly met,” concluding that the defendant was a “thorough-going 
Nazi and a faithful follower of Adolph Hitler,” who had falsely sworn otherwise 
at the time of his naturalization.161 Again, however, the Court was not unanimous. 
Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented, agreeing that the evidence showed 
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Knauer to be “a thorough-going Nazi, addicted to philosophies altogether hostile 
to the democratic framework in which we believe and live,” but asserting that 
denaturalization violated constitutional principles.162 “[C]itizens with strings 
attached to their citizenship, for its revocation, can be neither free nor secure in 
their status.”163 
In both the majority opinion and the dissent, the justices placed great 
reliance on the heightened evidentiary standard. The majority suggested that the 
standard was required for due process in a denaturalization proceeding, stating 
that the consequence of denaturalization could be severe enough to “result in the 
loss ‘of all that makes life worth living,’” and therefore cannot be left to 
“conjecture”; otherwise, “valuable rights would rest upon a slender reed” and be 
vulnerable to shifting political winds.164  According to the majority, this meant that 
not only did the trial court have to be persuaded by “‘clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing’ evidence, which does not leave ‘the issue in doubt,’” but also that the 
appellate court has a duty to “reexamine facts” found by the lower courts.165  
Justice Rutledge’s dissent agreed, stating that even “if [he] may be wrong” 
in concluding that denaturalization itself is unconstitutional, “certainly so drastic 
a penalty as denaturalization, with resulting deportation and exile and all the 
attendant consequences, should not be imposed by any procedure less protective 
of the citizen’s most fundamental right . . . . [A]t the least this should be done only 
by those forms of proceeding most fully surrounded with the constitutional 
securities for trial which are among the prized incidents of citizenship.”166 He 
pointed out that loss of citizenship entailed a loss of liberty even greater than 
incarceration in a criminal action, stating that it is “altogether anomalous that 
those safeguards are thrown about . . .  when, for some offense, his liberty even for 
brief periods is at stake, but are withdrawn from him when all that gives substance 
to that freedom is put in jeopardy.”167 
iii. Later Cases: Continued Questions about the Basis for Heightened 
Procedural Protections 
 In 1948, the Court again grappled with the basis of the Schneiderman 
ruling—did it create a procedural due process right that could be extended to 
                                                      
162 Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 678 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. at 
165 Id. 658-59  
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
33 
 
forbid default judgment? A majority of the Court agreed that a judgment 
denaturalizing August Klapprott by default must be reversed, though the Court 
was sharply divided.168 Klapprott was a member of the German American Bund, 
accused of sympathy to Nazi Germany and disloyalty to the U.S. While his civil 
denaturalization suit was pending, however, he was arrested and confined to jail 
on federal criminal charges. His criminal conviction was later overturned by the 
Supreme Court in a case unrelated to the denaturalization proceeding.169 He had 
been unable to afford an attorney to represent him in the civil case, and his 
incarceration prevented him from appearing personally at the denaturalization 
trial.170 As a result, the district court granted a default judgment of 
denaturalization.171 
 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Five justices agreed with the 
ultimate result, but they diverged in their rationales. Justice Black wrote the 
plurality opinion (joined by Justice Douglas). He cited Schneiderman for the 
proposition that “because of the grave consequences incident to denaturalization 
proceedings we have held that a burden rests on the Government to prove its 
charges in such cases by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which does 
not leave the issue in doubt.”172 In his view, the burden required for 
denaturalization “is substantially identical with that required in criminal cases-
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” He concluded that the government had not met 
this standard in the court below.  
 Justice Rutledge concurred in an opinion joined by Justice Murphy, and 
would have gone even further; they reiterated their view that denaturalization was 
unconstitutional in its entirety:  
 
To take away a man’s citizenship deprives him of a right no less 
precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today 
comprehends those rights and almost all others. . . .  Yet by the 
device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the 
safeguards of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights, 
this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been 
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held, can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most 
cruel penalty of banishment.173 
 
The plurality viewed this outcome as especially inappropriate in a default 
judgment, which necessarily lacks the procedural protections of a true adversarial 
proceeding: “The undenied allegations already set out show that a citizen was 
stripped of his citizenship by his Government, without evidence, a hearing, or the 
benefit of counsel, at a time when his Government was then holding the citizen in 
jail with no reasonable opportunity for him effectively to defend his right to 
citizenship.”174 
Although Justices Rutledge and Murphy had not been able to get a 
majority of the Court to sign on for this view, they did agree that Schneiderman 
required, at the very least, substantially heightened due process. They again 
compared it to the constitutional standard required in criminal cases, writing that 
Schneiderman “required a burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect 
approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases, namely, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for 
denaturalization,” and that it did so “in view of the substantial kinship of the 
proceedings with criminal causes,” and with the understanding that “ordinary 
civil procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other purely 
civil liabilities, do not suffice for denaturalization and all its consequences.”175 
Furthermore, the defendant’s failure to show up to trial did not relieve the 
government of the need to meet that heightened burden.176 
 More than thirty years later, however, there was substantial turnover in the 
Court—but the Court still seemed at odds over the basis for Schneiderman’s 
procedural protections. In Vance v. Terrazas, a Mexican-American dual national 
was alleged to have voluntarily given up his citizenship.177 The Supreme Court 
divided over the question of whether the standard of proof was of common-law 
origin (and thus subject to being overruled by an act of Congress) or whether it 
was of constitutional origin.178 The Court in that case held that the government had 
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not sufficiently shown that the dual national had intended to expatriate himself, 
thus allowing him to keep his American citizenship. In dicta, however, a majority 
of the Court sided with the common-law view of the standard of proof, citing 
Schneiderman as one of several cases that “did not purport to be [a] constitutional 
ruling.”179 The Court further distinguished decisions adopting a heightened 
standard in criminal cases, stating that “expatriation proceedings are civil in 
nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty.”180   
Again, however, the opinion drew sharp disagreement from those who 
believed that a heightened evidentiary standard was constitutionally mandated. 
Justice Marshall wrote that he “cannot understand, much less accept, the Court’s 
suggestion that ‘expatriation proceedings  . . . do not threaten a loss of liberty.”181 
He believed that a “clear and convincing” standard of proof in denaturalization 
cases was required under the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote a separate 
opinion likewise stating that “[i]n my judgment a person’s interest in retaining his 
American citizenship is surely an aspect of ‘liberty’ of which he cannot be deprived 
without due process of law.  . . . I believe that due process requires that a clear and 
convincing standard of proof be met in this case as well before the deprivation 
may occur.”182 
 Just a year later, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld 
the denaturalization of a man who had concealed his past as a concentration-camp 
guard.183 In doing so, the Court applied Schneiderman’s heightened burden of proof 
and Baumgartner’s more searching appellate review.184 This time, the Court’s 
majority opinion implied that such procedural protections were constitutionally 
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required: “Any less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the importance 
of the right that is at stake in a denaturalization proceeding.”185 
The Court’s back-and-forth over the source of the heightened procedural 
protections in denaturalization makes it difficult to determine the scope of 
legislative power—and difficult to predict how future cases will come out. But 
whether the requirement for a heightened evidentiary burden is grounded in the 
Constitution or in the common law likely makes little difference for modern cases, 
as Congress has not adopted a lower standard for denaturalization. Thus, modern 
denaturalization cases must be guided at least by a “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof, and the scope of appellate review must be commensurate with 
the heightened burden of proof. 
B. Substantive Constitutional Protections 
While the Supreme Court’s cases based on procedural due process dealt 
with the question of how citizenship could be taken away, the Court also decided 
several cases on substantive grounds that looked at the question of whether 
citizenship could be taken away under certain circumstances. Cases of 
expatriation—that is, taking citizenship away from individuals even if born in the 
United States, often as a sanction for conduct deemed inconsistent with 
citizenship—proved to be particularly divisive, though the Court ultimately held 
that individuals could not be expatriated without their voluntary consent. The 
holding was extended in a subsequent case to naturalized citizens. In reaching 
these decisions, however, the Court was even more divided than it had been on 
the procedural questions—and once again, the driving force behind that 
disagreement was an inability to reach a common theory of citizenship.  
i. Limiting Expatriation as Punishment 
When Congress adopted citizenship-stripping laws aimed at various forms 
of behavior deemed to be incompatible with citizenship—including voting in a 
foreign election, serving in a foreign military, leaving the country to avoid U.S. 
military service, and others—these laws were challenged by individuals unwilling 
to forfeit their citizenship.  Trop v. Dulles was an early case in which the Supreme 
Court was faced with the question of whether citizenship could be taken away as 
a punitive measure.186 The petitioner, Albert Trop, was a native-born U.S. citizen 
who served in Morocco during World War II.187 During this time, he was sent to a 
military stockade as punishment for some infraction. He then escaped from the 
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stockade, but returned to base and turned himself in after spending less than a day 
away. Nonetheless, he was court-martialed, convicted of wartime desertion, 
sentenced to three years’ confinement, and dishonorably discharged. Five years 
after he completed his sentence, he applied for a passport and discovered only 
then that he had also been stripped of his citizenship and was therefore ineligible 
to obtain a passport.188 He filed suit seeking a declaration of citizenship. 
When Trop’s case reached the Supreme Court, the justices sharply divided 
over the outcome. A majority of the Court held that Trop’s denaturalization 
violated the Constitution, but less than a majority agreed on the rationale. Chief 
Justice Warren wrote the opinion for a four-judge plurality, concluding that 
denaturalization violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment, writing that the individual who is stripped of citizenship 
“has lost the right to have rights.”189 He explained that denaturalization puts the 
individual at risk of deportation, causes “the total destruction of the individual’s 
status in organized society,” and “strips the citizen of his status in the national and 
international political community.”190 Taken together, the plurality found these 
consequences to be “a form of punishment more primitive than torture.”191  
While the plurality’s language was strong, it did not garner a majority of 
the Court. Justice Brennan declined to join the majority opinion and concurred in 
the judgment, writing separately that Congress exceeded its authority under the 
war power because the expatriation was intended as “naked vengeance,” and was 
not reasonably calculated “to further the ultimate congressional objective—the 
successful waging of war.”192 In less egregious circumstances, however, he 
suggested that expatriation could be within the war power of the legislative 
branch. 
Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton, Clark, and Harlan. 
The dissent argued that denaturalization for wartime desertion fit easily within 
Congress’ war power; it referred to military services as “this ultimate duty of 
American citizenship,” and stated that “Congress might reasonably have believed 
the morale and fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers 
knew that their fellows who had abandoned them in their time of greatest need 
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were to remain in the communion of our citizens.”193 The dissent also disagreed 
that loss of citizenship was the harsh penalty that the plurality and Justice Brennan 
believed. Instead, the dissent said, expatriation was far less harsh than the death 
penalty, which was also a potential consequence of wartime desertion; “in truth, 
[the individual who has lost his citizenship] may live out his life with but minor 
inconvenience. He may perhaps live, work, marry, raise a family, and generally 
experience a satisfactorily happy life.”194 
In 1963, the Supreme Court again turned to the question of expatriation as 
punishment. Francisco Mendoza-Martinez, a dual U.S.-Mexican citizen, left the 
United States in 1942 “solely, as he admits, for the purpose of evading military 
service in our armed forces.195” When he returned to the United States, he was 
arrested and convicted of failing to comply with the selective service laws. After 
serving his time, he was released—but five years later, the government sought to 
deport him, alleging that he had lost his citizenship under section 401(j) of the 
Nationality Act of 1940, which provided that: “A person who is a national of the 
United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by  . . .  
[d]eparting from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in 
time of war . . . .”196 
The Supreme Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. The 
majority opinion noted that Congress had a great deal of latitude under the 
foreign-relations and war powers,197 and certainly there was a clearer connection 
to the war power in Mendoza-Martinez than there had been in Trop—after all, 
entirely evading the draft is likely to cause greater harm to military objectives than 
merely spending a few hours off base. Nevertheless, the Court said, the sanction 
of expatriation was a consequence so serious that it could deprive an individual 
“of all that makes life worth living.”198 As a result, it could not follow from a mere 
civil action: “If the sanction these sections impose is punishment, and it plainly is, 
the procedural safeguards required as incidents of a criminal prosecution are 
lacking.”199 Instead, the Court held, the heightened process of a criminal case 
would be required before such a serious punishment could be imposed. “[T]he 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments mandate that this punishment cannot be imposed 
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without a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment, notice, 
confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses.”200 The Court acknowledged that its holding might 
legitimately be criticized for “immunizing the draft evader.” But it prioritized the 
underlying citizenship interest and the procedures that protect that interest, 
writing that “the Bill of Rights which we guard so jealously and the procedures it 
guarantees are not to be abrogated merely because a guilty man may escape 
prosecution or for any other expedient reason.”201 Thus, after Mendoza-Martinez, 
expatriation as a sanction for voluntary behavior would require criminal process. 
ii. Curtailing Involuntary Expatriation 
During the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court also struggled with 
an even more fundamental question: does the Constitution allow citizenship to be 
involuntarily taken away at all? The question sharply divided both the Court and 
the public. The Court’s first answer to that question, in Perez v. Brownell was 
“yes.”202 The Court concluded that Congress had the right to pass such an 
expatriation statute as part of its foreign affairs authority under the Constitution. 
In a 5-4 opinion, the Court upheld the expatriation of an individual who had voted 
in a Mexican election, and was therefore held to have expatriated himself.203 
Six years later, however, the Supreme Court shed some doubt on the Perez 
holding in Schneider v. Rusk.204 Angelika Schneider was a naturalized American 
citizen born in Germany. She later married a German citizen and moved with her 
husband to live there. By the early 1960s, women no longer lost U.S. citizenship 
merely by marrying a foreigner.205 Nonetheless, Congress had passed a statute 
providing that naturalized citizens (regardless of gender) who moved back to their 
country of origin would lose their United States citizenship.206 In Schneider, the 
Court held the statute unconstitutional because it treated native-born citizens 
more favorably than naturalized citizens.207 The Court noted that “the Fifth 
Amendment contains no equal protection clause,” but that it does “forbid 
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discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”208 In the 
Court’s opinion, the treatment of naturalized citizens under the statute qualified 
as just such a violation.209 Native-born citizens, after all, could live abroad with no 
fear of losing their citizenship.210 Treating naturalized citizens differently “creates 
indeed a second-class citizenship” and “in no way evidences a voluntary 
renunciation of nationality and allegiance.”211 
 In 1967—less than a decade after Perez—the Court would return to the 
question of constitutional power to involuntarily revoke citizenship. This time, the 
Court would extend the principle it had announced in Schneider and formally 
overrule Perez. The case involved Beys Afroyim, a naturalized American citizen 
who moved to Israel and voted in an election for the Israeli Knesset.212 He then 
sought a declaratory judgment affirming his U.S. citizenship, expressly seeking to 
overturn the Perez case.213 The Court noted that Perez had not been well-received; 
it stated that the case “has been a source of controversy and confusion ever since,” 
and that the Court’s later cases “as well as many commentators,” had “cast great 
doubt upon the soundness of Perez.”214  
 In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court—again in a 5-4 opinion—this time 
adopted the dissenters’ view from Perez.215 The Court first rejected the idea that 
“Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an American 
citizen’s citizenship without his assent.”216 It then grounded its holding more 
firmly in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” The purpose of this 
amendment, according to the Court, was to firmly establish the right of citizenship 
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and to take it out of the hands of the legislature217—particularly in the post-Civil-
War era, when legislators might have tried to limit the political rights of 
individuals formerly held in slavery.218 Even though the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were focused on the end of slavery rather than the permissibility of 
expatriation, the Court concluded that principles of “liberty and equal justice” 
expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment required overruling Perez.219 Indeed, the 
Court said, “[t]he very nature of our free government makes it completely 
incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in 
office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”220 
C. A Retreat to Statutory Formalism  
The ruling in Afroyim sounded as if it might put the issue of 
denaturalization to rest once and for all. But even though the decision got a 
majority opinion, it was still seen as vulnerable by those dissatisfied with the 
ruling.221 It was, after all, a 5-4 decision reversing a different 5-4 decision less than 
a decade old.  
A year later, after Chief Justice Warren resigned from the Court, observers 
expected that a change in the Court’s makeup could lead to reversing Afroyim. And 
one case seemed to offer the perfect vehicle: Aldo Bellei, who was born and raised 
in Italy but possessed American citizenship through his mother, challenged a law 
that would strip the citizenship of individuals born abroad who failed to live in 
the U.S. for at least five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.222 
Indeed, President Nixon’s new appointee, Harry Blackmun, wrote in an early 
memo to the Court that he was inclined to overrule Afroyim.223  
However, one of the justices who had dissented in Afroyim was 
nevertheless unwilling to overrule it—Justice John Harlan believed strongly in 
following precedent even when he disagreed with a case on the merits.224 As a 
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result, the decision in Bellei left Afroyim undisturbed by walking a narrow textual 
ground—because the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause only applies to 
those “born” or “naturalized” in the United States, the Court held that it did not 
prohibit the involuntary expatriation of Aldo Bellei, who was a natural-born 
citizen born in Italy.225  
With the Afroyim holding left undisturbed (though narrowly interpreted), 
fewer denaturalization cases entered the litigation pipeline. In the four decades 
after Bellei reaffirmed the central holding of Afroyim, only four cases have reached 
the Supreme Court. All three of those cases would continue to apply a narrow and 
formalist approach; none would return to Afroyim’s broad statements of “liberty 
and equal justice.”226  
One of those cases was Vance v. Terrazas, discussed above,227 which 
interpreted the standard for “voluntary” expatriation. Congress had passed laws 
providing that certain conduct (voting in a foreign election; serving in a foreign 
military) was inconsistent with citizenship and would be deemed to provide 
conclusive evidence that an individual had voluntarily abandoned U.S. 
citizenship.228 In Terrazas, however, the Supreme Court shut down this approach, 
concluding that an expatriation action must be supported by evidence of 
affirmative intent to give up citizenship—intent cannot be inferred from foreign 
service alone.229 The decision protected individuals by interpreting 
“voluntariness” to require an individual intent to give up citizenship—not just an 
intent to engage in an action that Congress deemed inconsistent with citizenship.230 
Again, however, the opinion was a narrow one taking a very formal interpretation 
of the relevant language; it did nothing to clarify the underlying constitutional 
interests at stake. 
 The remaining three cases dealt with individuals whose naturalization was 
originally procured illegally or by fraudulent means. Fraud and illegal 
procurement were the main avenues left open for denaturalization after Afroyim, 
specifically carved out of the reach of the opinion. In a footnote, the Afroyim 
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majority left open a remaining route for denaturalization: setting aside cases 
where naturalization had occurred fraudulently or unlawfully.231 Post-1967, this 
ground became the primary avenue left for denaturalization. 
 The first case, Fedorenko v. United States, involved a defendant who had 
allegedly served as a concentration-camp guard in Treblinka, Poland during 
World War II. The government brought a denaturalization suit against Fedorenko, 
alleging that he fraudulently concealed this background to obtain naturalization. 
Furthermore, the statute allowing Fedorenko to immigrate to the United States as 
a “displaced person,” specifically excluded individuals who “assisted the enemy 
in persecuting” civilians or who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces.”232 
Fedorenko admitted that he had been a guard at Treblinka, but argued that his 
actions were involuntary, arguing “that he had been forced to serve as a guard” 
and denying “any personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the 
camp.”233  
 The Supreme Court acknowledged that it created two lines of precedent 
“that may, at first blush, appear to point in different directions.”234 The first line, 
the Court said, “recognized that the right to acquire American citizenship is a 
precious one and that once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe 
and unsettling consequences.”235 Thus, denaturalization was required to meet a 
high burden of proof.  
But the other line, the Court said, “recognized that there must be strict 
compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition 
of citizenship.”236 This line, in the Court’s view, required it to uphold Fedorenko’s 
loss of citizenship based on his misrepresentations even assuming that his work 
as a guard resulted from involuntary forced labor. Under this very formalist 
approach, the Court deferred to Congress, “acknowledg[ing]  . . . the fact that 
Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe rules for 
naturalization,” and that the Court’s role is to “assure compliance” with its 
exercise of that role.237 Because Fedorenko’s concealment allowed him to gain an 
immigration status he would not otherwise have qualified for, he had “illegally 
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procured” citizenship and it must be revoked.238 Because the Court held that strict 
compliance with the statute required denaturalization regardless of duress, the 
Court did not reach the larger question of legal complicity.239 One commenter 
writing shortly after the decision was rendered described the Fedorenko opinion as 
“unexpected” and a “totally mechanical exercise.”240 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court applied a similarly formalist analysis 
in the denaturalization case of Kungys v. United States, which involved an alleged 
guard at a Lithuanian concentration camp, whose purported actions came to light 
only when the Soviet Union released videotaped depositions implicating 
Kungys.241 Kungys was authored by Justice Antonin Scalia relatively early in his 
tenure on the Court, and it showcased the textualist approach he would become 
known for.242 Justice Scalia’s opinion was partly a majority opinion and partly a 
plurality opinion, as the Court yet again fractured in deciding a denaturalization 
case. This time, however, the fracturing did not reveal a fundamental 
disagreement about the nature of citizenship; instead, the disagreement centered 
on relatively minor matters of textual interpretation. In the words of one scholar, 
“[t]he Kungys court, confused and fragmented, finally settled on an odd approach 
to the problems of the statute and achieved little. . . . Rather than furthering values 
and larger legislative purposes, the Court wrestled with language until it lost.”243 
In the opinion, the Court accepted the finding of the courts below that there 
was insufficient evidence that Kungys had personally been involved in executing 
Lithuanian citizens; the district court had found the Soviet-era depositions to be 
“inherently unreliable.”244 However, the evidence did show that Kungys had 
misrepresented his date and place of birth, as well as his wartime occupation and 
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residence.245 The central question before the Court was whether Kungys’s 
misrepresentations were material to his naturalization.246 On this point, a majority 
of the Court agreed that a misrepresentation was material if it had a “‘natural 
tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decision-
making body to which it was addressed.”247 Thus, even a relatively minor lie, such 
as a misstatement about the town of one’s birth, could be material if it influenced 
the naturalization decision.248  
Justice Scalia went on to conclude, in a part of the opinion that garnered 
only four votes, that Kungys’s misrepresentation of his birth information had not 
been shown to be material; whether other misrepresentations might have been 
material would have to be determined on remand.249 On the second ground for 
denaturalization—that Kungys’s misrepresentations amounted to false testimony 
demonstrating that he lacked the moral character required for naturalization, and 
thus “illegally procured” it—the plurality agreed that no materiality requirement 
was necessary.250 Even a lie that did not itself affect the naturalization decision 
could demonstrate a lack of moral character.251 This point, however, would also be 
remanded—this time for the lower court to determine whether Kungys’ 
misrepresentations (essentially, false statements contained on application forms) 
amounted to “testimony” as required by the immigration statute.252  
It wasn’t until 2017 that the Supreme Court accepted another 
denaturalization case. Maslenjak v. United States was one of the rarer criminal 
prosecutions for naturalization fraud.253 Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb who 
resided in Bosnia during the civil war of the 1990s, came to the United States as a 
refugee and gained citizenship in 2007.254 As a refugee, Maslenjak had testified 
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under oath that her husband had spent the war years secreted away, evading 
military service.255 And when she sought naturalization, Maslenjak stated that she 
had never given “‘false or misleading information’ to a government official while 
applying for an immigration benefit.”256 In fact, however, Maslenjak knew all 
along that her husband had actually served in the Bosnian Serb Army, in a brigade 
that had participated in the Srebrenica massacre.257 Maslenjak was charged with 
immigration fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), which “makes it a crime to 
‘knowingly procure[ ], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person.’”258 Both 
the district court and the court of appeals accepted the prosecutors’ interpretation 
that the statute did not require any showing of materiality—the courts held that 
the conviction could be sustained by evidence of an intentional misrepresentation 
in the naturalization process, regardless of whether that misrepresentation led to 
the naturalization. 
Once again, the Supreme Court hewed to a textualist analysis in its review 
of those decisions. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court 
concluded that the statute’s language—requiring that an individual “procure” 
nationalization “contrary to law” impliedly contains a materiality element.259 The 
Court began with the dictionary definition of “procure,” and analyzed its use in 
ordinary speech.260 It concluded that the prosecutors’ position “falters on the way 
language naturally works,” and held that materiality was implied by the language 
of the statute.261 The Court then concluded that on remand, the jury should be 
asked to consider what impact Maslenjak’s false statement had on the ultimate 
naturalization decision.262 
 In Maslenjak, unlike many of the earlier cases, the Court was relatively 
unified. The Court unanimously agreed on the necessity of a ”materiality” finding. 
Justice Gorsuch joined all but Part II.B. of the Court’s opinion. He issued a 
concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, writing that he would go no further than 
stating the need to instruct the jury regarding materiality on remand, preferring to 
leave the specifics of that instruction to the district court. Justice Alito filed a 
separate concurrence, arguing that a statement could be material even it did not 
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ultimately affect the final denaturalization decision, offering an example of a 
defendant who believes that his or her false statement would procure 
naturalization—even if that statement did not actually influence the final 
decision.263 
Only after basing its ruling on the text itself did the Court raise the 
“disquieting consequences” of the prosecution’s position—if the interpretation 
were otherwise, prosecutors would have “nearly limitless leverage” and new 
citizens have “precious little security,” as nearly every immigrant would have a 
misstatement, however minor, in their application. The application, after all, asks 
“Have you EVER committed . . . a crime or offense for which you were NOT 
arrested?”264 At oral argument, this question clearly troubled the justices, as it 
would seem to allow the denaturalization of anyone who failed to report each and 
every instance in which they exceeded the speed limit without being pulled 
over.265  Interestingly, the discussion of this issue was contained within the part of 
the opinion joined by all nine justices, suggesting that the Court unanimously 
agreed that undermining the security of naturalized citizens would raise grave 
constitutional concerns.  
But it is just this concern that is now reflected in the Borgoño case. Her 
denaturalization is sought on the basis of an alleged crime for which she had not 
been arrested at the time of her naturalization application. That crime—looking 
the other way and continuing to provide ordinary administrative support while 
her boss was engaged in financial wrongdoing—is likely one that many people in 
a financially vulnerable position would commit, however, making it harder to 
argue that her actions demonstrate moral turpitude sufficient to disqualify her 
from citizenship. Especially given the tight connection between employment and 
health insurance, even persons of high moral character might find it difficult to 
risk losing their job by taking a stand against their employers’ fraud. 
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IV. The Problem with Civil Denaturalization  
It is understandable that after its sweeping constitutional holding in 
Afroyim, the Supreme Court would turn to a more narrow formalism in later cases. 
After all, the holding in Afroyim stood on shaky ground after the decision, and 
there was valid concern that a new appointment to the Court would swing the 
pendulum back toward the Court’s previous holding in Perez. Focusing more 
narrowly on textual interpretation allowed the Court to maintain the broader 
constitutional holding over the next fifty years and come to agreement in the cases 
that followed. 
And for the subsequent half-century, the Court’s narrower approach did 
little or no harm to the civil and political rights of naturalized citizens. The number 
of attempted denaturalizations declined dramatically, as a consequence of both 
the heightened constitutional protection and a rapid decline in the Red Scare. Not 
only was Communism seen as less of a threat to the United States’ interest, but a 
respect for civil liberties, freedom of thought, and equal treatment was viewed as 
the antidote to totalitarian regimes.266 American public discourse presented civil 
liberties—and the due-process protections backing them up—as essential aspects 
of what it means to be American.267 
The few denaturalizations of alleged Nazi concentration-camp guards and 
other war criminals during the fifty years between 1967 and 2017 did little to 
disrupt an overall sense of citizenship security. The American political identity 
may be complex and variegated, but the ethos of “Never Again” meant that it 
included no room for those who supported the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi 
regime.268 Excluding such individuals from the body politic comported with the 
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original approach of President Taft’s Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, 
who ordered U.S. Attorneys to refrain from indiscriminately filing 
denaturalization proceedings against every single citizen for whom naturalization 
was alleged “to have been fraudulently or illegally procured.”269 Good cause for 
denaturalization existed, he said, only if “some substantial results are to be 
achieved thereby in the way of betterment of the citizenship of the country.”270  By 
the same token, it sent a message that those who sought refuge from the Nazis in 
the United States were truly American, and would be protected from those who 
had once persecuted them. As a result, programs seeking to identify and 
denaturalize former war criminals enjoyed broad support from the American 
public. Difficult questions about the constitutionality of those programs could 
therefore go unresolved. But with the return of aggressive denaturalization 
programs, questions of constitutional legitimacy require an answer. 
A. The Procedural Due Process Deficiencies of Civil 
Denaturalization 
 One of the most glaring constitutional weaknesses of civil denaturalization 
was identified by the Supreme Court back in 1943: the lack of procedural due 
process in ordinary civil litigation.271 The return of denaturalization as a political 
priority brings the issue of due process to the forefront. In 2018, a man was 
stripped of citizenship without being personally served with process, without 
making an appearance in the case either personally or through an attorney, and 
without benefiting from even a contested hearing at the summary judgment stage. 
He may not, even today, know that he has lost his citizenship rights. Even if 
nothing in the case violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the proceedings 
nevertheless give rise to serious questions of procedural due process. 
As discussed above,272 the Supreme Court added some heightened 
procedural protections beyond what is ordinarily available in civil litigation: the 
Court required a heightened burden of proof and overturned a denaturalization 
obtained by the defendant’s involuntary default.273 The Court’s language 
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suggested that the risk of losing citizenship was serious enough to warrant 
heightened procedure; it required the government to meet a burden “substantially 
identical with that required in criminal cases,” and asked that this level of proof 
be met even in cases where the defendant did not make an appearance.274  
Not all of the justices agreed that the heightened procedure was 
constitutionally required—but some did, including most notably Justice 
Rutledge.275 Justice Rutledge’s concurrence in Klapprott emphasized that ordinary 
civil litigation was insufficient to protect against the erroneous deprivation of 
citizenship.276 Treating a denaturalization suit “as if it were nothing more than a 
suit for damages for breach of contract or one to recover overtime pay,” he argued 
“ignores . . . every consideration of justice and of reality concerning the substance 
of the suit and what is at stake.”277 He referred to the right of citizenship as “this 
most comprehensive and basic right of all,” arguing that it should not be subject 
to “the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards 
of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights.”278 
More than half a century has passed since Justice Rutledge suggested that 
ordinary civil litigation could not offer the constitutionally required level of 
procedural due process to defendants at risk of losing their citizenship. In the 
intervening decades, the Court has refined the doctrine of procedural due process. 
The Court’s modern doctrinal developments do not cast doubt on Justice 
Rutledge’s earlier concerns. Instead, they go further, supporting the notion that 
civil litigation is utterly inadequate to protect the defendant’s liberty interest in 
citizenship.  
The Supreme Court’s current approach to procedural due process was 
adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge.279 The Eldridge case applied “what is in essence a 
cost–benefit analysis, weighing the risk that the plaintiff will be erroneously 
deprived of liberty against the cost of providing additional procedures to 
safeguard against such error.”280 To conduct that analysis, the Supreme Court 
wrote, trial courts must take into account three factors: first, the individual’s 
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“private interest that will be affected by the official action”; second, “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and 
third, “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.”281 Thus, the court must weigh both the individual’s 
liberty interest in the outcome of the case and the government’s administrative 
burden in providing heightened procedure, and the court must evaluate whether 
adopting such a heightened procedure would offer significant protection against 
the “erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s rights.282 Under this standard, a 
court deciding a denaturalization case would therefore have to look at all three 
factors. First, what is the individual’s interest in retaining citizenship? Second, 
what kind of a cost or administrative burden would it create to offer the defendant 
additional procedural protections? And finally, how much protection would those 
procedures actually offer—that is, to what extent could we rely on those 
procedures to protect against the erroneous deprivation of the defendant’s 
citizenship rights?  
Even on a purely individual and instrumentalist level, the right to 
citizenship is an important one. Citizenship carries with it the right to vote in state 
and federal elections and the right to carry a passport that allows for international 
travel.283 Citizenship also allows individuals to qualify for employment in some 
government jobs, allows individuals to run for office if they so desire, and makes 
it easier for people to bring relatives to the United States.284 
But the most important aspects of citizenship transcend the merely 
instrumental. To Chief Justice Warren, citizenship was not just fundamental—it 
was the most fundamental right from which all the others were derived.285 It is true 
that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its characterization of the 
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citizenship right, with justices sometimes suggesting that the deprivation of 
citizenship causes no real harm to the individual, who may still go about his or her 
life without obvious disruption,286 while other times recognizing that the loss of 
citizenship threatens to “result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’”287 
But as discussed above, citizenship is about much more than civic duties exercised 
on an occasional basis, such as voting or serving on a jury; instead, citizenship goes 
to the very heart of membership in the political polity.288 It is a right to belong, a 
right to participate in the political life of the country, and a right to feel secure in 
one’s national identity.289 Whether citizenship is seen as the “right to have rights,” 
or whether it is viewed more narrowly as a right to participate in the exercise of 
sovereign authority, its central place in American history cannot be ignored.290 The 
country, after all, was founded on the ideal of citizens’ exercise of sovereign 
authority.291 Can civil litigation offer adequate protection for those rights? 
Certainly, the Supreme Court in Schneiderman and Klaprott thought that at the very 
least, certain procedures would need to be modified; those cases required a 
heightened burden of proof and disallowed a default judgment to be granted 
without an evidentiary hearing. However, current cases show that even these 
protections are not enough. A summary judgment, entered after the 
government’s affidavits are simply taken as true, does not offer significantly more 
protection than the default judgment in Klaprott. The Singh case demonstrates the 
problem: the government enters into evidence an affidavit stating that Singh’s 
failure to show up for asylum hearing more than twenty years ago was a result of 
intentional fraud. If taken as true, as it was in the one-sided hearing, then the 
statement meets the “clear and convincing” standard. But to observers outside the 
courtroom, not bound to accept the government’s statement as true, that 
conclusion does not lend itself to confidence. What motive would Singh have had 
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to lie about his name, when he had never been denied asylum on the merits, and 
no factual findings had been made as to his particular case? 
At an adversarial hearing, that question could have been asked. Perhaps 
the answer would have pointed toward immigration fraud; perhaps it might have 
suggested a more innocent explanation. But under the current procedures in play, 
we have no way of knowing. Did Singh know that he had been sued? If so, was he 
unable to afford an attorney to represent him? Does he know, even now, that a 
judgment of denaturalization has been entered against him? Could he have had a 
factual defense to the suit against him? Without answers to these questions, it is 
difficult to have confidence in the outcome of the case. 
An adversarial hearing, with both parties represented by counsel, would 
go a long way toward protecting against the erroneous deprivation of citizenship 
rights. Attorneys prosecuting such cases have admitted as much. By identifying 
the “benefits” of pursuing a civil case rather than filing charges—including the 
lack of a jury trial, the availability of summary judgment, and the absence of any 
right to counsel—they admit that these procedural features make denaturalization 
easier to obtain. The procedural protections offered in a criminal action make 
denaturalization more difficult to achieve—and therefore do more to protect 
against the erroneous deprivation of citizenship. 
Eliminating civil denaturalization admittedly comes with costs—financial, 
administrative, and systemic. The financial and administrative costs arise from 
handling denaturalization through immigration-fraud proceedings in the criminal 
justice system, rather than through civil litigation. Naturalization fraud is a felony, 
and it has been more than fifty years since the Supreme Court held that due 
process requires an attorney to be appointed in felony cases for individuals unable 
to afford counsel on their own.292 Criminal procedure likewise ensures that 
defendants have actual notice of the proceedings against them, including the right 
to confront witnesses.293 And unlike the law for civil denaturalization, the 
immigration-fraud enactment carries a statute of limitations; cases may not be 
brought after more than ten years after the fact.294 Applying these heightened 
procedures means that each denaturalization case will cost more to prosecute; the 
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cost of counsel, and the cost of trial proceedings, will be greater than the cost of a 
summary-judgment hearing in which only the government appears.  
But even if the cost of each proceeding is higher, it is likely that the financial 
costs will be offset by a lower total number of prosecutions. The statute of 
limitations in naturalization-fraud cases means that some number of cases will be 
unprosecutable. And even though the Supreme Court has applied a heightened 
burden of proof in denaturalization cases, that heightened burden has recently 
been interpreted as requiring “clear and convincing” evidence, which is still a 
lower burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Taking these factors 
together, it is likely that significantly fewer cases could successfully be 
prosecuted—especially from Operation Janus, which looks back well beyond the 
ten-year statute of limitations.295 If fewer cases are subject to prosecution, then a 
reduction in the number of viable cases could offset the increased cost of providing 
enhanced procedural protections in the cases that remain. Fewer prosecutions, of 
course, means that some people may “get away” with committing naturalization 
fraud. But even Attorney General Wickersham realized back in 1907 that many 
such cases of fraud were not worth pursuing, especially when the individuals 
offered no risk to the larger society.296  
The elements of the due-process analysis work together interdependently 
and therefore require balancing multiple factors. Establishing a right to counsel 
and a mandatory notice procedure, for example, means weighing the financial cost 
of providing these measures against the truth-finding benefits of the adversary 
process. Applying a heightened burden of proof and imposing a statute of 
limitations means weighing the risk of erroneous removal of citizenship against 
the risk of erroneous non-enforcement. Even the best justice system must operate 
in hindsight; no trial can ensure perfectly accurate fact-finding. In balancing these 
risks, American courts have general held that “it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”297 If the citizenship interest is central to the 
nation’s foundation and identity—and this Article argues that it is—then both the 
financial costs and the risk that an occasional individual might wrongfully gain 
and keep citizenship are a small price to pay to avoid unjustly stripping citizenship 
from others.  
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B. Beyond Procedure: The Constitutional Infirmities of Civil 
Denaturalization 
The centrality and importance of the underlying citizenship right extends 
beyond procedural due process. While procedural due process “asks whether the 
government has followed the proper procedures when it takes away life, liberty 
or property,” courts look to the doctrine of substantive due process to determine 
“whether there is a sufficient substantive justification, a good enough reason for 
such a deprivation.”298 Of course, these matters are closely related; just as the 
substantive value of the underlying liberty interest must be weighed in the 
procedural due process analysis, so too are the availability and adequacy of 
procedural protections considered in a substantive due process analysis.299 And, 
of course, substantive due process also interacts with other constitutional 
protections—which for denaturalization necessarily includes the Citizenship 
Clause.300 Again, however, civil denaturalization falls far short of constitutional 
protections.  
The Supreme Court’s precedent in Afroyim and Schneider may be enough 
to find civil denaturalization unconstitutional. Those decisions, after all, warn 
against applying different standards to naturalized citizens and those born in the 
United States.301 But denaturalization for fraud and illegal procurement is 
applicable only to naturalized citizens, not to those born in the United States—the 
very dichotomy that the Schneider Court ruled impermissible when it held that 
Congress could not denaturalize citizens for living abroad in the country of their 
birth, as such a requirement by its nature could not apply to native-born U.S. 
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citizens.302 The Schneider court warned that such distinctions risk creating “a 
second-class citizenship” that discriminates against naturalized citizens.303 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause that supported the 
holding in Afroyim likewise suggests that Congress lacks the power to take away 
citizenship once it is granted. While it is true that the Afroyim court specifically 
excluded cases of fraud and illegal procurement, the opinion’s logic covers the 
situations we see today. The underlying concern of Afroyim was that 
denaturalization could be wielded as a political weapon—that a group of citizens 
“temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”304 
And yet that is exactly what we see with Operation Janus and the proposed 
denaturalization task force: current political expediency supports looking back 
through the files of individuals naturalized years or decades ago, and, in 
particular, prioritizing the files of individuals from countries deemed to be less 
than friendly to the current political leadership. 
The Supreme Court’s post-1967 development of substantive due process 
and equal liberty in cases outside of the denaturalization context strengthens this 
conclusion. Substantive due process is grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which forbid depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”305 The doctrine asks whether particular restrictions 
on liberty are constitutionally valid—that is, whether there is “a sufficient 
substantive justification” for that deprivation of liberty.306 It protects against the 
arbitrary loss of fundamental rights. Scholar Timothy Sandefur has used Shirley 
Jackson’s short story The Lottery to illustrate the idea of substantive due process.307 
In the story, villagers must choose a member to undergo what the reader later 
learns is a death by stoning. The villagers make their choice of individual through 
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a procedure that is scrupulously fair, ensuring that each villager has the same 
chance to be chosen at random—but the horror of the story is the utter arbitrariness 
of the ultimate fate. In Sandefur’s words, the story illustrates a “fundamentally 
arbitrary, yet regular procedure.”308 The essential protection of substantive due 
process is the protection of the underlying right. Even equitable procedures can 
violate due process if they arbitrarily deprive individuals of a fundamental right.  
The Supreme Court’s most recently articulated the substantive due process 
test in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that states could not restrict the right to 
same-sex marriage.309 In Obergefell, the Court noted that the first question is 
whether the liberty at issue can be characterized as a fundamental right.310 In 
determining whether a right is truly fundamental, the Court must consider 
“central reference to specific historical practices.”311 Citizenship, as the foundation 
of voting and political participation (the “preservative of all other rights”) has the 
requisite important and historical pedigree to qualify as a fundamental right.312 
The deprivation of a fundamental right requires a compelling state 
interest.313 Civil denaturalization fails that test. In contrast to the central role that 
citizenship has played over the nation’s history, expatriation and denaturalization 
have played only supporting roles, with the passage of time throwing them into 
significant disfavor.314 For the first century of American life, citizenship revocation 
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was a rarity in the political process.315 Although its use grew in the early part of 
the twentieth century, revocation had largely receded by the latter part of that 
century.316 It is hard to imagine a compelling need for a process that is so little 
used—and, at the same time, so susceptible to the political winds. 
That is not to say that there is no state interest in civil denaturalization. 
First, the Supreme Court has noted the importance of protecting Congress’ 
constitutional power to set naturalization requirements; if citizens failing to meet 
Congress’ stated requirements are naturalized nonetheless, then that action would 
usurp Congress’ power.317 Second, some have emphasized the importance of 
deterring immigration fraud.318 If naturalization is irrevocable, then perhaps 
individuals will believe that they have nothing to lose by engaging in fraudulent 
conduct. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, some have identified an 
interest in protecting the nation’s political fabric against those who mean it harm: 
during the early Cold War era, that resulted in the attempted exclusion of 
communists.319 In the modern era, it has led to proposals to denaturalize 
individuals with ties to terrorism.320 
None of these interests can withstand heightened scrutiny, however.321  
First, protection of Congress’ naturalization power can be accomplished on the 
front end with careful review of the naturalization application through an 
administrative process that is likely both less expensive and more systematic in 
rooting out potential fraud or error. Likewise, whatever disincentives to fraud the 
denaturalization program might produce are likely vastly overshadowed by the 
incentives inherent in the system. Even without denaturalization, there are 
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tremendous incentives to avoid immigration fraud. Getting caught during the 
immigration or naturalization process means getting permanently barred from the 
United States and potentially spending time in prison for immigration fraud.322 If 
someone is foolish enough—or desperate enough—to be willing to risk those 
consequences, they are unlikely to be deterred by the fear that they could be 
denaturalized years or decades later. Finally, the state interest in protecting the 
nation’s political fabric is likely served through more narrowly targeted 
procedures: pursuing criminal actions against actual and attempted terrorist acts 
to ensure physical safety, while safeguarding civil liberties to allow the 
marketplace of political ideas to serve the nation’s interests. The lesson of 
McCarthyism during the Red Scare was that the political fabric of the nation is 
strongest when political ideas are freely expressed; trying to suppress political 
disagreement is itself a threat to the American identity and political fabric.323 
C. Civil Denaturalization’s Threat to Constitutional Democracy 
 The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a consistent theory of citizenship 
leaves the Court’s denaturalization doctrine unmoored from the constitutional 
foundations of democracy. Chief Justice Warren articulated the connection 
between constitutional democracy and citizenship in the middle of the century.324 
Warren’s view derived from founding principles enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence: “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”325 Under this conception, Warren 
argued, citizenship reflects the very “right to have rights.”326 That is, it is not the 
state that creates the right of citizenship; instead, the citizens themselves possess 
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325 Id. (quoting The Declaration of Independence para. 2). 
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sovereignty, delegating to the state “the power to function as a sovereignty” as 
part of the social contract.327  
 Although the Supreme Court has not continued to engage in discussion of 
citizenship theory, scholars of democratic process have extended the conversation. 
Shai Levi articulated three traditional theories of citizenship applied by countries 
around the world: citizenship as security (that is, a state-granted right to 
permanently reside in a territory, as in the United Kingdom), citizenship as a social 
contract (founded on the consensual allegiance of the citizen, reflecting the view 
of United States citizenship expressed by Chief Justice Warren), and citizenship as 
an ethnonational bond (with Israel presented as “the closest representative of this 
model”).328 Rainer Bauböck and Vesco Paskalev expanded further on this 
approach, offering contrasting conceptions of the fundamental basis of 
citizenship.329 One is a state-directed approach in which citizenship is founded on 
state discretion; under this view, “citizenship policies should primarily serve the 
goals of the State represented by a democratically legitimate government.”330 
Another approach, however, which historically held sway under the United States 
constitutional order, views citizenship “as an individual entitlement that is held 
against the State . . . a foundation of individual autonomy analogous to individual 
property that the State must protect and of which it cannot deprive its citizens 
without losing legitimacy.”331  
 The idea of citizenship as part of a social compact that gives rise to an 
individual right is woven into the fabric of American democracy, and is the only 
theory consistent with American constitutional structure. As one scholar has 
written, “[u]nlike Europe’s ethnic and cultural nationalism, American nationalism 
is basically civic; the United States is an idea-based nation.”332 Individuals “willing 
to respect and accept” the political tenets of our constitutional system were 
welcomed into the American polity; it was the shared commitment to the 
Constitution and to the political order that it represented that defined a shared 
                                                      
327 Id. (“[T]he citizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not subject to the general 
powers of their government.”). 
328 Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States, and 
Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404, 408 (2010). 
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331 Id. (emphasis added). 
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national identity.333 The polity was formed first, before the state gained 
sovereignty; and upon the nation’s founding, “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.”334 
 Under Chief Justice Warren’s view of denaturalization, the state therefore 
could not involuntarily denaturalize an individual—especially not as a matter of 
ordinary legislative policy.335 After all, if the state’s sovereign power existed only 
as a delegation from its citizens, then how could the state presume to take 
citizenship away?336 Such an action would be a usurpation of power. Ultimately, 
of course, the view originally expressed by Warren would prevail in later Supreme 
Court cases. As the Court stated in both Mendoza-Martinez and in Schneider, “the 
power to expatriate endows government with authority to define and to limit the 
society which it represents and to which it is responsible.”337 As the Court 
recognized in those cases, such a view does not comport with the constitutional 
framework of the United States.  
 The current denaturalization policies threaten the cohesion of a political 
structure founded on a sovereign citizenry.338 In the United States’ constitutional 
democracy, it is the status of citizenship that, in Alexander Meiklejohn’s words, 
establishes an individual as both “ruler” and “ruled”—and thereby provides the 
basis for political freedom.339 The Supreme Court in Afroyim adopted a similar 
theory of citizenship, stating that “[c]itizenship in this Nation is a part of a 
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334 U.S. CONST., amend. X. 
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cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.”340 
Making the citizenship of naturalized citizens vulnerable to political winds 
changes the very character of that country—and that is the effect of 
denaturalization, even when such policies are theoretically targeted at cases of 
immigration fraud or illegal procurement. 
It is no answer to say that not all naturalized citizens will, or even can, be 
so targeted. The problem is not the number of citizens subject to denaturalization 
proceedings, but rather the arbitrariness of who is targeted—and the political 
message that is sent by that targeting.341 Combining selective enforcement with 
race, religion, or national origin—as with Project Janus’s focus on “special interest 
countries,” for example—gives rise to serious constitutional concerns.342 When the 
government pursues cases that are neither clear-cut nor morally reprehensible, it 
is easy for naturalized citizens to identify with denaturalization defendants. Few 
people would personally identify with a Nazi concentration camp guard. But a 
grandmother with a rare kidney disease, nervous about keeping her job, who 
looked the other way when her boss committed financial crimes?  Or a non-
English-speaking immigrant whose translator may have filed an asylum action 
under the wrong name, causing him to miss a court date? It is easy for people to 
imagine themselves in the shoes of many of those at risk of losing their 
citizenship.343  
That feeling of exclusion creates a chilling effect as individuals fear for their 
own status. Actions “targeting the foreign-born” have been recognized by scholars 
as “threaten[ing] the social contract and expos[ing] the vulnerability of 
immigrants’ rights to political manipulation.”344 It can cause the fears expressed in 
                                                      
340 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268  (1967) 
341 As journalist Masha Gessen has pointed out in the context of anti-LGBT legislation in Russia, 
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earlier cases to come to pass: naturalized immigrants may feel excluded from the 
body politic, afraid to participate in public life lest they run afoul of individuals in 
power who might seek to deport them.345 Of course, this was the very consequence 
that Justice Douglas warned about in Schneiderman.346 
 Ultimately, the loophole for fraud and illegal procurement is not as limited 
as it might have felt to the Afroyim Court when it excluded fraud actions from the 
case’s broad holding. History instructs us—and modern cases confirm—that 
bureaucratic error and ordinary human frailty give rise to very common 
vulnerabilities throughout the immigration process. A case filed under the wrong 
name can be difficult to distinguish from an individual trying to get a second bite 
at the apple in an asylum proceeding.347 A moment of weakness from an individual 
in a vulnerable position can raise later questions about “moral character.”348  And, 
as the justices on the Supreme Court pointed out in the oral argument in Maslenjak, 
minor crimes such as speeding are nearly ubiquitous, and most cases do not result 
in getting ticketed.349 Maslenjak’s materiality requirement can help ensure that 
some minor violations do not result in criminal prosecution for illegally procuring 
naturalization. But Maslenjak’s standard does not apply in civil cases, and even 
when there is an analogous materiality provision, it would not help in situations 
like Singh’s or Borgoño’s.350 
The primary force behind the Supreme Court’s protection of citizenship 
status may simply be a “fear that the state would abuse any denationalization 
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power it is recognized to have.”351 Certainly, the very concept of citizenship can 
also be used as a weapon to attack members of an opposing political party. 
Suggesting that certain individuals—or members of certain disfavored groups—
are not legitimately part of the nation’s citizenry is a way of casting doubt on their 
right to participate in public life.352 And to the extent that civil and political rights 
flow from citizenship, it suggests that those civil rights deserve lessened state 
protection. 
 Thus, for example, when thirteen Russians were criminally charged in the 
United States for conspiring to undermine the 2016 U.S. election, Russian 
president Vladimir Putin attempted to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their 
Russian citizenship, reportedly saying “‘Maybe they are not even Russians . . . but 
Ukrainians, Tatars or Jews, but with Russian citizenship, which should also be 
checked.’”353  
 The overtly anti-Semitic message underlying the statement was certainly 
disquieting, and it was rightly subjected to immediate international pushback.354  
But the belief that some legal citizens are not full or “real” members of a society is 
an idea that is gaining international traction with the rise of ethno-nationalism355—
including within the United States, a nation founded on the integration of an 
immigrant population into the political fabric of the country.356 Thus, for example, 
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President Trump falsely tweeted:  “Just out that the Obama Administration 
granted citizenship, during the terrible Iran Deal negotiation, to 2,500 Iranians – 
including to government officials. How big (and bad) is that?”. In fact, the 
negotiation had not included any deal for citizenship. And if President Trump’s 
tweet could be charitably read only to mean that such naturalizations had occurred 
over the same time period, it seriously undercounted the number of Iranian 
citizens naturalized during that period—in 2015, over ten thousand of them.357
 Even if the content of the tweet is demonstrably false, its metamessage358 
still matters. And the underlying meaning of the tweet is twofold, focusing on 
political affiliation as well as national origin: that is, the tweet suggests that both 
individuals naturalized under a previous political administration and citizens 
born in Iran should be viewed with suspicion. It echoes Putin’s statement, 
suggesting that for some people citizenship may be merely a legal technicality and 
not a  fundamental identity shared by all.359  
The view that citizenship may be a mere legal technicality undermines a 
political system founded on the participation of its citizens.360 When this view is 
combined with efforts to strip away the naturalization of long-time citizens, it 
becomes even more destructive to the political order and to the foundations of the 
United States’ constitutional democracy. Impugning the citizenship of individuals 
based on national origin raises the concern expressed by Alexander Aleinikoff, 
which is the “fear that the state would abuse any denationalization power it is 
recognized to have.”361  
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V. Conclusion 
The possibility of civil denaturalization, which lay mostly dormant for fifty 
years, is increasingly becoming a political reality. As more cases are litigated, 
courts will have to answer several questions. The first is whether civil 
denaturalization is constitutional as a matter of substantive due process and of the 
Citizenship Clause. If so, then what level of procedural protection is required to 
take away someone’s citizenship? Even hardened immigration enforcement 
advocates should take pause at the idea that a person can lose citizenship without 
ever being personally served with process, having the opportunity to obtain legal 
counsel, or even appearing in court. Stripping political rights without adequate 
procedural safeguards destabilizes the very concept of citizenship by sending the 
message that naturalized citizens may never be an integral part of the polity. It 
also upends the fundamental principle of the United States’ founding: that the 
state has only the power delegated to it by its citizens, and has no power to take 
that citizenship away. If naturalized citizens cannot feel secure in their substantive 
and procedural rights, natural-born citizens (and especially those considered 
undesirable by the government for any reason) may not be far behind in losing 
theirs. Thus, it is time for courts to draw a clear border around citizenship. 
 
